这引发我们对当今政策的思考。中国各级政府采取 “改土归流” 的干部回避政策,即主要领导干部异地任职、原则上不允许在其家乡地任职。这对于规避 “地方诸侯” 和裙带关系具有重要作用,但也导致许多负面影响。就乡镇政府而言,任用本地乡镇长对于外派党委书记有很强的制衡作用——这是否也是可以讨论的改革方向呢?
参考文献
Hou, Linke, Mingxing Liu, Dali L. Yang, and Ji Xue. "Of time, leadership, and governance: Elite incentives and stability maintenance in China." Governance (2017), DOI: 10.1111/gove.12286.
Persson, Petra, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2016. "The Limits of Career Concerns in Federalism: Evidence from China." Journal of the European Economic Association 14 (2): 338-374.