Hans M. Kristensen, Chinese Jin-SSBNs Getting Ready? FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 2, 2011
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/06/jin2011.php
My comment:
(a) Xiaopingdao naval base
A Chinese-language web site refers to it as 小平岛潜艇基地; whether it is a nval base or submarine base is debatable.
(b) Please take notice of a dialogue, beyond the text.
Rick says: "How does the author know the Chinese military only has a limited capability to communicate with the submarines while at sea?
Reply: "The second one is a conclusion based on – among other factors – the Pentagon’s annual report on China’s military capabilities.
(i) The pertinent part of
Military and Security Developments Involving teh People's Republic of China 2010; Annual Report to Congress. US Department of Defense, June 2010
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf
is as follows.
"The introduction of more mobile systems will create new command and control challenges for
China’s leadership, which now confronts a different set of variables related to deployment and release authorities. For example, the PLA has only a limited capacity to communicate with submarines at sea, and the PLA Navy has no experience in managing a SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrols with live nuclear warheads mated to missiles. Land-based mobile missiles may face similar command and control challenges in wartime, although probably not as extreme as with submarines." page 34
(ii) Compare
Chinese Boomers That Don't. Strategy Page, June 2, 2011.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20110602.aspx
The last [paragraph: "But there are other problems. The Chinese government is apparently uneasy with sending off an SSBN, armed with twelve or more SLBMs (Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles), each with one or more nuclear warheads. Western nations carefully select the officers and crews of their SSBNs, and use a host of codes and procedures (PAL, or "Permissive Action Links") to insure that a single madman cannot use any of those SLBMs. Russia also screened crews and had PAL codes, but also had, in effect, representatives of the secret police on the SSBN, whose main job was to insure that the SLBMs were used as the government back in Moscow commanded. China has always been much less trusting of the armed forces when it comes to nuclear weapons. China also appears to lack the PAL technology. All this doesn't get much mention in the West, but it is very real inside China. So when the Type 96 shows up, sometime late in this decade, it will be revealing to see if the Chinese have overcome their reluctance to trust a crew of Chinese sailors with all those nukes.
* Permissive Action Link
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permissive_Action_Link
("In the early 1990s the People's Republic of China requested information to develop its own PALs.[17] The Clinton administration believed that to do so would give too much information to the Chinese about American weapon design, and therefore, refused the request.")
Ref 17 is
Steven M. Bellovin: Permissive Action Links, Nuclear Weapons, and the Prehistory of Public Key Cryptography. Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, April 2006
http://www.usenix.org/event/usenix06/tech/slides/bellovin_2006.pdf
(at page 34: "Who Has PALs?
. In 1971, the US offered the technology to the Soviets.
. They declined, preferring “people watching people who watched still other people”.
+The Soviets used three-party control: the military, the KGB, and a political officer
* * *
. There’s more worry about rogue users within a country than the country itself. Did we offer the technology to France? China? (They asked for the technology in the 1990s.) Israel? India? Pakistan?")
----------------------------------Separately
(1)
(a) 南中国海如不确定行为准则，就会爆发冲突. VOA Chinese, June 4, 2011.
http://www.voanews.com/chinese/news/20110604-south-china-sea-123163528.html
(b) 越南：不会容忍“侵略”行为. BBC Chinese, June 5, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2011/06/110605_vietnam_warn_china.shtml
(c) 中国防长：中国不搞军事扩张. BBC Chinese, June 5, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2011/06/110605_china_singapore_security.shtml
("中国国防部长梁光烈重申中国国防策略属于防御性，他也承诺中国永远不称霸、不搞军事扩张")
(2) 也门总统离境治伤 局势仍然不明朗. BBC Chinese, June 5, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/world/2011/06/110605_yemen_situation.shtml
(3) A Mountain Of Steam. Strategy Page, June 5, 2011.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20110605.aspx
Note: Basically it says it is dangerous to serve in a naval ship.
(4) China Challenges AMRAAM. Strategy Page, June 5, 2011.
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairw/articles/20110605.aspx
Note: PL-12
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PL-12
(The PL-12 (PiLi-12, 霹雳-12), also designated SD-10 (ShanDian-10, 闪电-10), is a radar-guided air-to-air missile developed by China's Luoyang Electro-Optical Technology Development Center; In Service 2007)
(5) Never Bring a Rifle To A Missile Fight. Strategy Page, June 5, 2011
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/20110605.aspx
(Taliban resorted to elaborate methods to conceal location of a sniper, in vain)
..
【 在 choi (choi) 的大作中提到: 】
: Hans M. Kristensen, Chinese Jin-SSBNs Getting Ready? FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 2, 2011
: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/06/jin2011.php
: My comment:
: (a) Xiaopingdao naval base
: A Chinese-language web site refers to it as 小平岛潜艇基地; whether it is a nval base or submarine base is debatable.
: ...................
Hans Kristensen, Chinese Nuclear Forces 2010. FAS Strategic Security Blog, Nov 12, 2010
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2010/11/china2010-2.php
(rumor of JL-3 (no typo here) debunked)
【 在 choi 的大作中提到: 】
: Hans M. Kristensen, Chinese Jin-SSBNs Getting Ready? FAS Strategic Security Blog, June 2, 2011
: http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/06/jin2011.php
: My comment:
: (a) Xiaopingdao naval base
: A Chinese-language web site refers to it as 小平岛潜艇基地; whether it is a nval base or submarine b
: (以下引言省略...)