不理解或不遵循这一点，就会引出许多谬论，比如著名的罗斯福四大自由（The Four Freedoms）谬论，其中1、2、4三条与自由有关，但第3条“免于匮乏的自由”（freedom from want）便与自由和权利毫无关系，一个人，在别人不对他做任何事的情况下，也可能匮乏，正如鲁滨逊也可能匮乏，而自由必须与别人做的或可能做的事有关，因而，“免于匮乏”不可能成为一种自由或权利，相反，把它误认为一种自由将荒谬的导致合法抢劫这一逻辑结果，类似的，如果你承认每个人都拥有“免于绝子绝孙的自由”，那么，合法强奸便是它的逻辑结果，如此一来，整个关于权利和自由的伦理和法律体系便瓦解了。
The validity of the determinist point of view and, separately, its bearing on an individual's moral responsibility for his actions, has been debated by philosophers and theologians for centuries past, and no doubt will be for centuries to come. I suspect that both Rose and Gould are determinists in that they believe in a physical, materiahstic basis for all our actions. So am I. We would also probably all three agree that human nervous systems are so complex that in practice we can forget about determinism and behave as if we had free will. Neurones may be amplifiers of fundamentally indeterminate physical events. The only point I wish to make is that, whatever view one takes on the question of determinism, the insertion of the word 'genetic' is not going to make any difference. If you are a full-blooded determinist you will believe that all your actions are predetermined by physical causes in the past, and you may or may not also believe that you therefore cannot be held responsible for your sexual infidelities. But, be that as it may, what difference can it possibly make whether some of those physical causes are genetic? Why are genetic determinants thought to be any more ineluctable, or blame-absolving, than 'environmental' ones?
不理解或不遵循这一点，就会引出许多谬论，比如著名的罗斯福四大自由（The Four Freedoms）谬论，其中1、2、4三条与自由有关，但第3条“免于匮乏的自由”（freedom from want）便与自由和权利毫无关系，一个人，在别人不对他做任何事的情况下，也可能匮乏，正如鲁滨逊也可能匮乏，而自由必须与别人做的或可能做的事有关，因而，“免于匮乏”不可能成为一种自由或权利，相反，把它误认为一种自由将荒谬的导致合法抢劫这一逻辑结果，类似的，如果你承认每个人都拥有“免于绝子绝孙的自由”，那么，合法强奸便是它的逻辑结果，如此一来，整个关于权利和自由的伦理和法律体系便瓦解了。
The validity of the determinist point of view and, separately, its bearing on an individual's moral responsibility for his actions, has been debated by philosophers and theologians for centuries past, and no doubt will be for centuries to come. I suspect that both Rose and Gould are determinists in that they believe in a physical, materiahstic basis for all our actions. So am I. We would also probably all three agree that human nervous systems are so complex that in practice we can forget about determinism and behave as if we had free will. Neurones may be amplifiers of fundamentally indeterminate physical events. The only point I wish to make is that, whatever view one takes on the question of determinism, the insertion of the word 'genetic' is not going to make any difference. If you are a full-blooded determinist you will believe that all your actions are predetermined by physical causes in the past, and you may or may not also believe that you therefore cannot be held responsible for your sexual infidelities. But, be that as it may, what difference can it possibly make whether some of those physical causes are genetic? Why are genetic determinants thought to be any more ineluctable, or blame-absolving, than 'environmental' ones?