权利（right）是个很广泛的概念，从不同角度出发可以有完全不同甚至对立的含义。
关于各项权利的区分，有多种可供选择的归类方法（其中有些存在争议），一般是把全
部权利分为对立的两大类，例如自然权利与法定权利，消极权利与积极权利，个人权利
与集体权利，等等。这些都是基本层次的分类，互相交错而不从属。上面列出的几种分
类适用于不同的场合，但本文主要依据另外一种分类：“自由权”与“要求权”（
liberty rights vs. Claim rights）。
有时狭义的“权利”仅指自由，比如美国许多州为驾驶执照笔试提供的交通法规手册上
都强调“开车是特权，不是权利”（Driving is a privilege, not a right），其实
在公共道路上开车是一项有特定资格限制的利权（所以称作特权），说它不是权利，指
的是它不属于自由。国内学者邓新华所论述的“权利就是自愿”也是狭义的权利概念，
仅指自由而不包括以政府权力为基础的利权。
liberty rights和claim rights的区分是法学家Wesley Hohfeld在二十世纪初做出的，虽然迄今并未在法学界得到广泛应用，但为其辩护的人也不少，可以说自成一派，在政治学与法学界是绕不开的概念。楼主如果是业余玩票，犯些错误还情有可原，如果是专业人士，整篇文章可以说是有辱师门了。我这篇回复，前面一半澄清一下楼主在理解这两个概念上犯的错误，后面一半顺带（当然无法深入）谈谈左派右派的问题。
liberty rights和claims rights之间的区别，并非像楼主所说的【“自由权”指的是权利的主体不受外界干涉的自主决定、自主行动权……“要求权”，又称“请求权”，指的是权利的主体向外界（通常是政府）提出诉求并得到满足】（这种区分逻辑上根本不通，因为两个定义既不能涵盖全集，相互间又存在交叉）。它们的真正区别在于：某个个体的某项claim right总是伴随着其他个体（或团体）的相应义务；相反，一个liberty right并不伴随任何义务。比如在一个保护私有产权的法律体系中，“这个东西是我的私有财产”这个claim，意味着别人有义务尊重我对这个东西的处置、有义务不侵占我的私有财产，所以在私有制社会中，private property right是一种claim right（楼主说【私有财产属于自由的范畴】，大谬特谬）。（注意：这里强调是私有制社会，因为liberty rights和claim rights的划分是一种逻辑划分，不是规范划分，换句话说，这种划分只考虑在给定的法律体系下，哪些权利对应着义务，哪些没有。当然，你可以主张说给定的法律体系应该包括不成文的自然法、高级法之类，但那是你的主张，不是这个划分本身带有的。）
再举例：我在路上捡起一枚硬币。假如这枚硬币是我刚才掉到地上去的，那么我在捡硬币这件事上就对周围的人具有claim right：这枚硬币是我的私有财产，其他人有义务尊重我对私有财产的处置，也就有义务不干涉我捡硬币这个举动（就算抢在我之前把硬币捡到手，也得乖乖还给我）。反之，假如这枚硬币不是我刚刚掉的，而是早就掉在路边很久没人要了，那么我在捡硬币上就只有liberty right而没有claim right：其他人没有义务非让我捡到这枚硬币不可，他们完全可以跟我比手快，谁捡到算谁的，我更不能对其他人说：“你们都不许捡，只能我捡。”换句话说，liberty rights赋予我某个行为的permission，而claim rights则给我entitlement。
那么楼主的第一个错误，就是想当然地从字面上理解claim rights/entitlement，从而把这个概念理解得太过狭隘。比如楼主说claim rights是【提出诉求并得到满足】，说entitlement是【从政府受益获利的代名词】，又说【换取来自政府的利权（福利和公共事业）】，这里“得到满足”、“受益获利”、“换取”都是错误的。claim right或entitlement并非要政府一定“做”什么事情、“给”我什么利益，相反，它完全可以是要政府“不做”什么事情。比如政府（以及其他任何个体和团体）不能滥杀无辜、不能随意没收私产，因为（在一般的法律体系下）right to life、private property right都是claim rights，都是个体的entitlements，相应地，其他个体和团体就有不侵犯这些权利的义务。楼主可能正是因为没搞清楚这一点，才会说【私有财产属于自由的范畴】（注意：财产的“获取”过程的确属于liberty rights范畴。我做生意赚钱，别人没义务非让我赚这个钱不可；竞争者通过合法手段把我的钱赚走了，我没啥好抱怨的。但一旦成为我的财产，我对其具有“财产权”之后，这个权利就不再是liberty right，而是claim right了，别人不能再从我这儿把财产强行抢走）。我后面还会回到这点上来。
比“把claim right理解得太狭隘”更严重的，是把哪些权利属于claim rights、哪些属于liberty rights，整个给搞反了。比如楼主说【比如美国许多州为驾驶执照笔试提供的交通法规手册上都强调“开车是特权，不是权利”（Driving is a privilege, not a right），其实在公共道路上开车是一项有特定资格限制的利权（所以称作特权），说它不是权利，指的是它不属于自由】。其实随便读几篇有关liberty rights vs. claim rights争论的文献（包括Hohfeld 1919年的开山之作Fundamental Legal Conceptions）就知道，liberty right有时也被称为privilege（注意：这并不意味着一般意义上的liberty等于privilege。在讨论liberty rights vs. claim rights的时候，一定要记住，这种区分和一般意义上的liberty、right等说法属于不同的体系），而claim right则会被简称为right，因为传统上（在Hohfeld之前）认为right和duty是一一对应的，而在Hohfeld的体系中，与duty对应的是claim right。所以“Driving is a privilege, not a right”这句话，恰恰应该理解成“Driving is a liberty right, not a claim right”，也就是说，政府没有“义务”给任何一个人颁发或延长驾照；假如政府不给你颁发驾照，你对此没法有任何“claim”。
楼主的第三个错误，是把claim rights与政府权力挂钩：【基于社会契约的政府和法律体系相当于社会成员让渡一部分个人自由以形成政府权力，后者回馈于社会成员就是利权】。实际上liberty rights、claim rights与社会契约无关，与政府权力也无关，纯粹是既定法律体系下概念内部的逻辑划分，都既可以针对政府，也可以针对其他个体公民与社会团体。比如我对我私有财产的claim right，针对的是其他所有个体与团体（他们有义务尊重我的产权）；而我和我老板签了个工资合同，那么这个月底我应得的工资就对老板构成了claim right（他有义务付给我这些工资）；等等。
第四，楼主说【利权不是基本的权利（自由）而是由失去的自由衍生而来，是自由的对立物，二者互为消长。例如，私有财产属于自由的范畴，但社会成员需要通过纳税的方式让渡一部分财产自由（也就是说没有不纳税的自由），以换取来自政府的利权（福利和公共事业）】。我前面已经说过把产权当作liberty right是错误的；除此之外，楼主这里营造的这种对立也是错误的。claim rights和liberty rights的确有某种对立关系，但不是楼主说的这种。拿前面捡硬币的例子说。假如地上的硬币是无主的，那我就有去捡这枚硬币的liberty right；但假如硬币是别人刚刚不小心掉的，而且他正准备捡这枚硬币，那么我的liberty right就不存在了，因为他对这枚硬币有claim right，这种claim right对我构成了duty，这个duty限制了我的liberty right的范围。这是claim right与liberty right之间的对立。
那么楼主举的这个“纳税换福利”的例子错在哪里呢？——前面说了，作者把claim rights误解成从政府那里获得利益，因而一则误以为财产权是liberty right，二则把重点放在强调从政府那里“换取”利益上。其实真正的对立不在于“让渡”和“换取”上，而在于“我的财产中我拥有claim right的部分”与“我的财产中我没有claim right的部分”（具体分析见后）。我对前者有claim right，意味着政府有义务尊重我的这部分财产，换句话说，政府不能强迫我上缴这部分财产（当然，我仍然拥有“大公无私主动把这些财产上缴国库”的liberty right，也有“选择不上缴”的liberty right）；相反，我对后一部分没有claim right，意味着政府可以强迫我上缴这部分财产（也就是我的税款），而政府对这部分税款的claim right，意味着我有缴税的义务，也就意味着我没有逃税漏税的liberty right。整个过程的关键，在于确定我的财产里，哪些是我有claim right的，哪些是我没有claim right的，而不在于是否从政府那里换取福利和公共服务（这并不是说从政府那里换取福利与此无关，而是说这是两个相关但不相同的过程，不能像楼主那样混为一谈）。楼主误以为liberals与libertarians的争论是claim rights vs. liberty rights的争论。其实不然，这个争论只涉及私有财产中有、无claim rights部分的划界，与liberty rights无关。
澄清了以上这些概念错误，也澄清了左右之争（注：“左派”、“右派”这种说法问题相当大，能不用时尽量不用为宜，出于简便，我这里用“左”专指liberal，“右”专指libertarian，别的派别一概不用这两个词称呼）的实质，接下来可以分析楼主对liberal主张的误解与（假如可以这么说的话）污蔑了。前面已经说了，左右之争，关键在于财产中claim right部分（在这个问题中就是“私有产权”，private property rights，前面说了，所有产权都是claim rights）的界定。首先要明确的是，左右两派都同意一点：个体并非对所有财产都有产权（除非是无政府主义者，才认为不应该向政府缴纳任何税款；但即便是无政府主义者，也认为“非法所得的财产”应该被充公），也并非对所有财产都没有产权（这是共产主义者的观点。所以所有把libertarians、liberals、communists摆在同一个政治光谱上的做法，都是极端错误的。共产主义者与其他两派有根本的不同，不能混为一谈），区别只在于对哪部分财产有产权，哪部分没有。
那么liberals在主张比libertarians更严格的产权划界时，都有哪些理由？首先，如前面所说，双方都同意并非所有财产都附着着产权，想要对财产拥有产权，必须在财产的获取上满足某些先决条件。有人可能会说：只要是合法所得就行。这个说法并不解决问题，因为两派争论的本来就是“法该怎么定”，争论的是成文法条背后的更高级的法理道德依据，是法律的公正性本身。所以我们要考察各方背后的道德推理是否站得住脚（当然咯，要在一篇帖子里考察整场争论里的各种推理是不可能的，我只能拎些要紧的出来说）。假定广义上的自由主义者们（不管左派还是右派）都接受这样的（洛克式的）看法：想要对某个物品拥有产权，获得该物品的过程必须是完善的市场机制下的合理交换（不是靠贪赃枉法巧取豪夺等等），要么用原来拥有的某种价值相当的物品交换，要么用价值相当的“劳动”创造或交换。
现在两个问题：一，怎么保证用以生产或交换的劳动或物品与该物品是“价值相当”的？我走在路上，天上突然掉下一块金砖，我弯腰捡起来，这个过程中我付出了多少“劳动”？弯腰伸手时做的功吗？我的好运气可不可以作为对这块金砖拥有产权的理由（或者拥有多大部分产权）？又比如太子党们生下来就穿金戴银，走上商途后处处有人照应，不到几年就赚得盆满钵满，这个过程中，有多少是靠他们的“劳动”，有多少是靠他们的出身？出身算不算获得产权的理由？再比如，我们知道市场机制有所谓马太效应、规模效应，买卖做到一定程度以后，不必再费什么心思，利润自然滚滚而来，这些利润多大程度上可以认为是出自我的劳动（或者说，市场机制的附加效应多大程度上可以被看作劳动所得）？二，怎么保证市场机制本身是“完善”（从而是公正）的？libertarians把希望寄托在市场本身的纠偏机制上，推崇“看不见的手”到了迷信的地步，而liberals则从各种角度论证市场的不完善、不公正，或者论证即便市场中每个局部的交易都是公正的，在各种偶然因素的作用下，这些局部交易的长期累加仍然会导致不公正，等等（具体论证就不写了，有兴趣的可以自己去读罗尔斯或者德沃金）。我不试图在这里为liberals辩护，只想指出，两派观点的正确与否，取决于道德理论上对运气、出身、市场放大效应、市场不完善性等各种因素的本质、以及对它们在产权获得中的作用的认识。假如这些因素在道德上并不具有完全的合理性（当然，这并不意味着它们像贪赃枉法一样是“完全不合理”的，只是“不完全合理”而已），假如它们在财产的获取中起到了作用，那么以累进税方式对这些因素进行部分的纠正，就是顺理成章的了。
但liberals的论证还不止与此。让我们从“为什么要有私有产权”（或者“私有产权为什么这么重要”）这个问题开始。前面说了，在私有制社会里，私有产权是claim rights，对应着其他个体和团体必须遵循的义务，这是liberals和libertarians共同认可的。但为什么要有私有权at all？为什么不像共产主义者所主张的，废除私有产权，大家共产共妻，不亦快哉？自由主义者（不论左右）共同的认识是，一定程度的私有财产是保障真正的公民权利与政治权利的基础。没有足够养活自己的财产（或者套用Amartya Sen的说法，没有足够过上minimum decent life的财产），凡事就得仰人鼻息，什么自由、权利都是空谈。既然如此，又有两个问题：一，有没有其他某些东西，和财产一样，是保障真正的自由、权利得以实现的基础？比如，基本的健康是不是？一定程度的受教育状况是不是？等等（当然，还有“什么样可以算‘基本’，算‘一定程度’”的问题）。如果这些东西和财产一样重要，既然在财产上我们有claim rights，在这些方面是不是也有与之相当的claim rights？换言之，政府是不是应该有在这些方面对公民加以保障的义务？
二，如果说一定程度的私有财产是公民权利与政治权利的基础，那么政府是不是有义务保证每个公民的私有财产都在这个“一定程度”以上（比如通过累进税+低保的方式？又比如通过最低工资法的方式？）？libertarians反对政府的干预，他们的理由是“市场能照看好一切”。先不论这种说法在理论上是多么匮乏，看看现实，19世纪资本主义早期工人的赤贫化，以及随之而来的社会主义、共产主义思潮的兴起，足够说明一切（话说libertarianism的领军人物哈耶克为了替右派辩护，曾经写文章声称19世纪英国工人过得很好，所有关于工人贫困潦倒的描述都是当时的保守党、农民、社会主义者一起在抹黑资本主义，只可惜他这篇文章刚刚结集在Capitalism and the Historians一书中出版，就遭到历史学家们坚实史料的反驳）。有鉴于此，我想我们可以说：libertarians、liberals、以及共产主义者们，这三个派别在口头上当然都是说，“我们要给所有人基本的权利”，但在实践上，共产主义者通过剥夺普通人的全部财产权（并集中在“领导人”手上），事实上剥夺了普通人的基本权利；而libertarians通过对市场机制下穷人财产权被剥夺这一过程视而不见，事实上承认了穷人基本权利的被剥夺；只有liberal主张能够真正地保证所有人的基本权利。在这个意义上，可以粗略地说（尽管我前面说过了，自由主义无论左还是右，都不能与共产主义放在同一个光谱上），libertarians和共产主义者处在光谱的两个极端，而liberals才是真正的中庸之道。
dikaios 对 liberty rights, claim rights，左派，右派的概念，我还有不赞同。
liberty rights 和 claim rights 的分类学，不是将现实社会的 rights 分成两类，而是现实社会的 rights 所具有的两个属性。我粗略想一下，两者是紧密相关，相互依赖的。因为 liberty rights 的表述中，离不开一个 “permission”的概念，而这个 permission 的对立概念是 prevention。那么，liberty rights 本身就必然隐含了他人不可阻止的概念在其中。所以，我认为这种分类学不是说存在两类 rights，而是从不同角度描述 rights 在不同情况下的不同性质。
比如私有产权，当没有受到他人侵犯，或者他人欠账的时候，这是一种 liberty rights。但是私有产权不可能不和其他社会成员发生关系，因此，必然在各种交易，借贷关系中，表现为 claim rights。
因此，dikaios 对“开车是特权，不是权利”（Driving is a privilege, not a right）的分析并不准确。这一说法，并不是从 liberty rights 和 claim rights 的角度去阐述的，而是从利权的获取是否无条件（born rights）的角度来阐述的。这句话的意思是，Driving is a acquired privilege, but not a born right. 驾驶的是有条件的。这和 liberty rights 和 claim rights 有些关系，但是并非从同一个角度去分析的划分。liberty rights 和 claim rights 是从一项 right 和其他人的 right / duty 之间的关系来分类的，而 driving license 上的这句话是从 right 的获取和终止的角度来分类的。
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claim_rights_and_liberty_rights
Claim rights and liberty rights
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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Claim rights and liberty rights
Negative and positive rights
Individual and Group rights
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Economic, social and cultural
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Animals · Humans
Men · Women
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Children · Youth · Students
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v • d • e
Some philosophers and political scientists make a distinction between claim rights and liberty rights. A claim right is a right which entails responsibilities, duties, or obligations on other parties regarding the right-holder. In contrast, a liberty right is a right which does not entail obligations on other parties, but rather only freedom or permission for the right-holder. This distinction originates in American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's analysis of "rights" into claims (or rights proper), liberties (or privileges), powers, and immunities, in his seminal work Fundamental Legal Conceptions, As Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays.
The other two terms of Hohfeld's analysis, powers and immunities, refer to second-order liberties and claims, respectively. Powers are liberty rights regarding the modification of first-order rights, e.g. the U.S. Congress has certain positive powers to modify some of U.S. citizens' legal rights, inasmuch as it can impose or remove legal duties. Immunities, conversely, are claim rights regarding the modification of first-order rights, e.g. U.S. citizens have, per their Constitution, certain negative immunities limiting the positive powers of the U.S. Congress to modify their legal rights. As such, immunities and powers are often subsumed within claims and liberties by later authors.
Contents
[hide]
* 1 The deontic logic of claims and liberties
* 2 Relation to positive and negative rights
* 3 See also
* 4 External links
[edit]The deontic logic of claims and liberties
A person's liberty right to x consists in his permission to do x, while a person's claim right to x consists in an obligation on others to allow or enable him to do x. For example, to assert a liberty right to free speech is to assert that you have permission to speak freely; that is, that you are not doing anything wrong by speaking freely. But that liberty right does not in itself entail that others are obligated to help you communicate the things you wish to say, or even that they would be wrong in preventing you from speaking freely. To say these things would be to assert a claim right to free speech; to assert that others are obliged to refrain (i.e. prohibited) from preventing you from speaking freely (that is, that it would be wrong for them to do so) or even perhaps obliged to aid your efforts at communication (that is, it would be wrong for them to refuse such aid). Conversely, such claim rights do not entail liberty rights; e.g. laws prohibiting vigilante justice (establishing a legal claim right to be free thereof) do not thereby condone or permit all the acts which such violent enforcement might otherwise have prevented.
However, a liberty right can be asserted as the inverse of a claim right: a person has a liberty right permitting him to do something only if there is no other person who has a claim right forbidding him from doing so. This is because the deontic concepts of obligation and permission are De Morgan dual; you are permitted to do all and only things you are not obliged to refrain from.
To illustrate, a world with only liberty rights, without any claim rights, would by definition be a world wherein everything was permitted and no act or omission was prohibited; a world wherein none could rightly claim that they had been wronged or neglected. Conversely, a world with only claim rights and no liberty rights would be a world wherein nothing was merely permitted, but all acts were either obligatory or prohibited. The assertion that people have a claim right to liberty - i.e. that people are obliged only to refrain from preventing each other from doing things which are permissible, their liberty rights limited only by the obligation to respect others' liberty - is the central thesis of liberal theories of justice.
[edit]Relation to positive and negative rights
The distinction between liberty rights and claim rights should not be confused for the distinction between negative and positive rights. Both liberty and claim rights come in positive and negative varieties: your permission to do something is a positive liberty right, your permission to refrain from something is a negative liberty right, another's obligation to do something for you is a positive claim right, and another's obligation to refrain from doing something to you is a negative claim right. However, the De Morgan dual relationship between claim rights and liberty rights crosses the positive-negative rights distinction: one's positive claims limit others' negative liberties and vice versa (i.e. others are obliged to do something for you if and only if they are not permitted to refrain from doing so); likewise, one's negative claims limit others' positive liberties and vice versa (i.e. others are obliged to refrain from doing something to you if and only if they are not permitted to do so).
[edit]See also
* Freedom versus license
* Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
[edit]External links
* The Form of Rights: The Hohfeldian Analytical System, Rights section 2.1, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
* Claim Rights & Liberty Rights, Human Rights section 3b, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
* The Difference Between a Right and Liberty, Professor William E. May
[hide]
v • d • e
Rights theory
Natural and legal rights · Claim rights and liberty rights · Negative and positive rights · Individual rights and Group rights
Natural law · Positive law · State sovereignty · Universal jurisdiction
Categories: Human rights | Rights
您对于“Driving is a privilege, not a right”的解释（政府没有“义务”给任何一个人颁发或延长驾照；假如政府不给你颁发驾照，你对此没法有任何“claim”）偏颇了 。这种解释是把学术界特定语境下privilege的含义硬生生用于日常生活；到街上随便拉一个母语是英语的老美、甚至交通部门的官员，问他们交通法规手册上那句话是什么意思，看谁能拧到学术的咬文嚼字上头？
【 在 lihlii 的大作中提到: 】
: https://groups.google.com/group/lihlii/msg/15a8f872e2c88b7f
: dikaios 对 liberty rights, claim rights，左派，右派的概念，我还有不赞同。
: liberty rights 和 claim rights 的分类学，不是将现实社会的 rights 分成两类，而是现实社会的 rights 所具有的两个属性。我粗略想一下，两者是紧密相关，相互
: (以下引言省略...)
你这是一种很典型的误解。事实上，Hohfeld之所以提出liberty rights vs. claim rights的区分，恰恰是要反对在他之前那种认为“允许”与“不可侵犯”是权利的“两个属性”的观点（即所谓的The Conflation of Permissibility and Inviolability Thesis）。你当然可以反对Hohfeld的观点，认为这种区分不对或者没意义，但只要你接受了这种区分，就必须在“liberty rights和claim rights是两种不同的权利，而非权利的两种不同属性”这个框架下去理解。
比如你说【私有产权，当没有受到他人侵犯，或者他人欠账的时候，这是一种 liberty rights】，这个说法在liberty rights vs. claim rights的框架下是完全错误的。因为一种权利是否为claim right，并不依赖于某些特定行为是否实际上已经发生；相反，它之所以是claim right，是由于已有法律（无论是习惯法、成文法、或自然法）中一开始就将它设定为具有对等义务的权利，而这种设定是发生在任何实际的行为之先的。这个东西是我的私有物产、我对它具有产权，这一事实本身就构成了我对其他任何个体或团体的claim：你们有义务尊重我对这个东西的产权，有义务不侵犯我对它的处置权。这个claim是先于任何欠账、抢劫等实际行为的，它的效力在任何这些实际行为发生之前就已经存在了。
【 在 lihlii (立里) 的大作中提到: 】
: https://groups.google.com/group/lihlii/msg/15a8f872e2c88b7f
: dikaios 对 liberty rights, claim rights，左派，右派的概念，我还有不赞同。
: liberty rights 和 claim rights 的分类学，不是将现实社会的 rights 分成两类，而是现实社会的 rights 所具有的两个属性。我粗略想一下，两者是紧密相关，相互依赖的。因为 liberty rights 的表述中，离不开一个 “permission”的概念，而这个 permission 的对立概念是 prevention。那么，liberty rights 本身就必然隐含了他人不可阻止的概念在其中。所以，我认为这种分类学不是说存在两类 rights，而是从不同角度描述 rights 在不同情况下的不同性质。
: 比如私有产权，当没有受到他人侵犯，或者他人欠账的时候，这是一种 liberty rights。但是私有产权不可能不和其他社会成员发生关系，因此，必然在各种交易，借贷关系中，表现为 claim rights。
: 因此，dikaios 对“开车是特权，不是权利”（Driving is a privilege, not a right）的分析并不准确。这一说法，并不是从 liberty rights 和 claim rights 的角度去阐述的，而是从利权的获取是否无条件（born rights）的角度来阐述的。这句话的意思是，Driving is a acquired privilege, but not a born right. 驾驶的是有条件的。这和 liberty rights 和 claim rights 有些关系，但是并非从同一个角度去分析的划分。liberty rights 和 claim rights 是从一项 right 和其他人的 right / duty 之间的关系来分类的，而 driving license 上的这句话是从 right 的获取和终止的角度来分类的。
: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Claim_rights_and_liberty_rights
: Claim rights and liberty rights
: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
: Rights
: Theoretical distinctions
: Natural and legal rights
: Claim rights and liberty rights
: Negative and positive rights
: Individual and Group rights
: Human rights divisions
: Three generations
: Civil and political
: Economic, social and cultural
: Right holders
: Animals · Humans
: Men · Women
: Fathers · Mothers
: Children · Youth · Students
: Minorities · LGBT
: Other groups of rights
: Authors' · Digital · Labor
: Linguistic · Reproductive
: v • d • e
: Some philosophers and political scientists make a distinction between claim rights and liberty rights. A claim right is a right which entails responsibilities, duties, or obligations on other parties regarding the right-holder. In contrast, a liberty right is a right which does not entail obligations on other parties, but rather only freedom or permission for the right-holder. This distinction originates in American jurist Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's analysis of "rights" into claims (or rights proper), liberties (or privileges), powers, and immunities, in his seminal work Fundamental Legal Conceptions, As Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays.
: The other two terms of Hohfeld's analysis, powers and immunities, refer to second-order liberties and claims, respectively. Powers are liberty rights regarding the modification of first-order rights, e.g. the U.S. Congress has certain positive powers to modify some of U.S. citizens' legal rights, inasmuch as it can impose or remove legal duties. Immunities, conversely, are claim rights regarding the modification of first-order rights, e.g. U.S. citizens have, per their Constitution, certain negative immunities limiting the positive powers of the U.S. Congress to modify their legal rights. As such, immunities and powers are often subsumed within claims and liberties by later authors.
: Contents
: [hide]
: * 1 The deontic logic of claims and liberties
: * 2 Relation to positive and negative rights
: * 3 See also
: * 4 External links
: [edit]The deontic logic of claims and liberties
: A person's liberty right to x consists in his permission to do x, while a person's claim right to x consists in an obligation on others to allow or enable him to do x. For example, to assert a liberty right to free speech is to assert that you have permission to speak freely; that is, that you are not doing anything wrong by speaking freely. But that liberty right does not in itself entail that others are obligated to help you communicate the things you wish to say, or even that they would be wrong in preventing you from speaking freely. To say these things would be to assert a claim right to free speech; to assert that others are obliged to refrain (i.e. prohibited) from preventing you from speaking freely (that is, that it would be wrong for them to do so) or even perhaps obliged to aid your efforts at communication (that is, it would be wrong for them to refuse such aid). Conversely, such claim rights do not entail liberty rights; e.g. laws prohibiting vigilante justice (establishing a legal claim right to be free thereof) do not thereby condone or permit all the acts which such violent enforcement might otherwise have prevented.
: However, a liberty right can be asserted as the inverse of a claim right: a person has a liberty right permitting him to do something only if there is no other person who has a claim right forbidding him from doing so. This is because the deontic concepts of obligation and permission are De Morgan dual; you are permitted to do all and only things you are not obliged to refrain from.
: To illustrate, a world with only liberty rights, without any claim rights, would by definition be a world wherein everything was permitted and no act or omission was prohibited; a world wherein none could rightly claim that they had been wronged or neglected. Conversely, a world with only claim rights and no liberty rights would be a world wherein nothing was merely permitted, but all acts were either obligatory or prohibited. The assertion that people have a claim right to liberty - i.e. that people are obliged only to refrain from preventing each other from doing things which are permissible, their liberty rights limited only by the obligation to respect others' liberty - is the central thesis of liberal theories of justice.
: [edit]Relation to positive and negative rights
: The distinction between liberty rights and claim rights should not be confused for the distinction between negative and positive rights. Both liberty and claim rights come in positive and negative varieties: your permission to do something is a positive liberty right, your permission to refrain from something is a negative liberty right, another's obligation to do something for you is a positive claim right, and another's obligation to refrain from doing something to you is a negative claim right. However, the De Morgan dual relationship between claim rights and liberty rights crosses the positive-negative rights distinction: one's positive claims limit others' negative liberties and vice versa (i.e. others are obliged to do something for you if and only if they are not permitted to refrain from doing so); likewise, one's negative claims limit others' positive liberties and vice versa (i.e. others are obliged to refrain from doing something to you if and only if they are not permitted to do so).
: [edit]See also
: * Freedom versus license
: * Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld
: [edit]External links
: * The Form of Rights: The Hohfeldian Analytical System, Rights section 2.1, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
: * Claim Rights & Liberty Rights, Human Rights section 3b, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
: * The Difference Between a Right and Liberty, Professor William E. May
: [hide]
: v • d • e
: Rights theory
: Natural and legal rights · Claim rights and liberty rights · Negative and positive rights · Individual rights and Group rights
: Natural law · Positive law · State sovereignty · Universal jurisdiction
: Categories: Human rights | Rights
: 【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: : liberty rights和claim rights的区分是法学家Wesley Hohfeld在二十世纪初做出的，虽然迄今并未在法学界得到广泛应用，但为其辩护的人也不少，可以说自成一派，在政治学与法学界是绕不开的概念。楼主如果是业余玩票，犯些错误还情有可原，如果是专业人士，整篇文章可以说是有辱师门了。我这篇回复，前面一半澄清一下楼主
: : (以下引言省略...)
【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: 你这是一种很典型的误解。事实上，Hohfeld之所以提出liberty rights vs. claim rights的区分，恰恰是要反对在他之前那种认为“允许”与“不可侵犯”是权利的“两个属性”的观点（即所谓的The Conflation of Permissibility and Inviolability Thesis）。你当然可以反对Hohfeld的观点，认为这种区分不对或者没意义，但只要你
: (以下引言省略...)
多谢你的质疑。后面关于liberalism与libertarianism孰优孰劣的争论，涉及的内容太多，恐怕要以后单开题目讨论才行，我还是先说一下和概念有关的几个问题吧。
首先，财产权是否涉及liberty rights？这点很明确：不涉及。因为在我具有私有产权的那部分物品上，我对其的任何处置都意味着其他个体或团体“不干涉我这种处置”的相应义务。举例说，假设我想把刚买的一本书撕下几页来一会儿上厕所当手纸用。由于这本书是我的私产，我对它的产权就意味着别人有义务不干涉我撕书擦屁股这种暴殄天物的举动。这种义务的存在，反过来说明了我对这本书的权利是claim right。
那么为什么很多人（包括你，lihlii，还有刚接触这个概念的其他一些人）会误以为财产权涉及liberty rights呢？我想可能是把liberty rights和其它语境下的liberty这两个概念等同起来了。要切记的是：在liberty rights vs. claim rights这个概念框架中，liberty的含义与其它时候的liberty是极其不同的（甚至可能全然相反）。比如洛克说的三种天赋权利，life、liberty、property，在这个框架下全部都是claim rights，而非liberty rights。
更具体一点，还举捡硬币的例子。我去捡一枚没人要的硬币，这个行为实际上由两部分构成：从弯腰去捡到最后捡起这一连串“捡”的举动，和通过捡起这枚硬币而使这枚硬币成为我的私有财产这个“获取”的过程。如果有人抢在我之前捡起了这枚硬币，我无话可说，因为“获取”这枚硬币只是我的liberty right，不对别人构成义务；但如果我在弯腰去捡的过程中，突然冲出一个警察毫无理由地拿手铐把我拷上，使得我没法完成捡起硬币这一连串动作，依照传统的说法，这个警察侵犯了我的“人身自由”，但这个“人身自由”在这里恰恰是claim right，而非liberty right，因为我的“人身自由”的存在本身对别人构成了“不侵犯我的人身自由”的义务。换句话说，liberty rights的范围比根据liberty这个词字面想像的要狭隘很多，我们日常所说的liberty，基本上是claim rights，而非liberty rights。Hohfeld自己也说过，所有“rights in the strict sense”都是claim rights，而非liberty rights。（也正是因为如此，很多人批评liberty rights vs. claim rights的区分在实际的应用中毫无用处，因为我们真正关注的东西都被claim rights囊括了；Hohfeld提出这个区分九十多年了，但美国最高法院从来没有用过这两个概念，也是认为它们没什么用处。当然，为这个概念框架的有用性辩护的人也很多，较新的比如Kramer, Simmonds & Steiner三人合著的A Debate Over Rights，有兴趣的话可以看看。）
与此类似，关于交规手册上的那段话，我的意思并不是说“交通部门的人以及平民百姓都很了解学术上的概念争论，并且把学术概念应用到日常生活中”（当然咯，不排除这种可能，毕竟编手册的人应该是受过法学训练的），我的意思是，法学家在发明（并讨论）liberty rights vs. claim rights这对概念的时候，liberty rights的内涵有很大一部分是与日常所说的privilege重合的（当然并不完全等同，因为privilege在日常中本身就有多重含义；更确切地说，liberty rights最接近的概念不是privilege，而是license，因为给你license就意味着给你permission，而permission就是liberty rights），而claim rights则更多地与日常所说的liberty、rights等概念重合。所以我说“Driving is a privilege, not a right”这句话应该理解为“Driving is a liberty right, not a claim right”，是没有错的。像我前面说的，关键是不能把日常所说的liberty和这里的liberty right混淆起来。
这也涉及到你所说的翻译问题。我不知道国内现在具体是怎么翻译这两个概念的（如果已有翻译的话），但把liberty rights翻译成“自由权”，这个本身就有点问题，因为国内现在约定俗成的办法，是用“自由权”指哈耶克liberty vs. liberties体系里头复数的liberties，一来二去恐怕就混淆起来了。至于究竟该怎么翻译好，我自己也没有一定的意见。
【 在 stuartl (stewie) 的大作中提到: 】
: 您好！多谢您回帖赐教！呵呵，俺是业余票友，理科生、工程师，写贴态度不严谨，上来先说好不写学术论文然后就迁就自己了，露了怯，该打！您是专业水平，上来就点出俺无法自辩的错误：俺很草率的解释了一下自由权与要求权，给出的解释不但过于狭窄（因为着眼于政治）而且在逻辑上不互补。正如您所说，二者的基本区别在于是否伴随其他个体的义务。俺学习原始英文资料的时候就很粗心（而且脑子里总是想着套用政治概念，没有体会深意），写贴的时候又没认真推敲，疏漏了这一要点，贻笑大方。闭门造车再加上偷懒，幸亏得到行家指正！
: 这一要点其实有助于俺帖子的主题：自由权不伴随外界的义务、要求权伴随义务，恰恰说明权利概念的这种分类方法和“契约”有关，没有“契约”就谈不上义务。这种“契约”可以是约定俗成的默契也可以是法律；俺的帖子的目的是讨论政治问题所以完全没有涉及与政治无关的权利（街上拣硬币之类），只谈论作为政府合法性来源的社会契约，也只涉及和政治有关的权利。从整体概念上讲，自由权和要求权确实不能完全和社会契约挂钩；俺本来也不是这个意思但行文很不严谨，需要改进！
: 私有财产是个很复杂的概念，俺试图一言以蔽之称之为自由确实不对，但是您把获取财产的过程之外的财产权完全归入要求权也不正确。外界对财产的尊重和保护是物主的要求权，物主对合法财产的支配是自由权。交税就是让渡了一部分支配财产的自由（这个税也不止所得税啊）。
: 原贴为了省事没有涉及“不被侵犯”之类的消极权利作为要求权的情况。“不被侵犯”的权利（外界“不侵犯”的义务）可以说也是一种利益，所以俺觉得“利权”这个词汇仍然可以作为“要求权”的同义词。“要求权”实在太拗口了。您有什么更合适的译法吗？
: 您对于“Driving is a privilege, not a right”的解释（政府没有“义务”给任何一个人颁发或延长驾照；假如政府不给你颁发驾照，你对此没法有任何“claim”）偏颇了 。这种解释是把学术界特定语境下privilege的含义硬生生用于日常生活；到街上随便拉一个母语是英语的老美、甚至交通部门的官员，问他们交通法规手册上那句话是什么意思，看谁能拧到学术的咬文嚼字上头？
: 社会契约挂钩的问题上面已经说过了；俺写贴的主旨是政治所以只讨论了与社会契约有关的利权和相应对立的自由。财产的支配处置权显然是自由，所以财产与福利的对立关系是成立的，虽然不是完全互补式的二分对立概念。财产是否合法所得，是另一个很有意思的话题；您说了，财产的“获取”过程的确属于自由，但这个自由是被法律限制的，“非法”的部分已被让渡。
: 上面的东西基本上不涉及意识形态所以应该算是比较客观也容易达成共识的。意识形态上俺和您的一个巨大的分歧在于如何看待财产作为利权的属性。您把财产权笼统作为利权，认为交税就是财产权在物主和政府之间分割利权。交税与收税作为社会契约规定的行为，确实存在互补关系，政府收来的税是物主的义务、政府的利权，但您忽视了物主对财产的支配权作为自由权的属性，所以没有意识到纳税义务与财产支配自由的对立消长关系，俺觉得是被liberal意识形态误导了。
: 您是liberal，俺是libertarian，各自对自己的意识形态敝帚自珍，实属难免。您认为liberal是真正的中间派，但liberal的问题在于对政府的依赖，即使出发点是善良的、过程是民主的，效果上也难免偏颇。“真正地保证所有人的基本权利”说起来轻巧；libertarian一般不会如此乐观，而是认为没有绝对的公正。承认现实社会无法避免的不公，不等于听之任之，而是在充分理解现实的基础上用理性的方式达到妥协并增进社会公正。
: 俺自认为比较温和（不反对累进税制和福利制度，只要别过分就可以了），对您推崇的liberal大师如罗尔斯也很尊敬。说liberatarian反对政府对市场的干预，是过于简化的说法，确切的讲，只要不是极端分子就不会强求100%的自由市场，只希望政府避免不必要的干预。极端liberal和极端libetarian都不可取，二者的温和派则能够有共同语言。俺经常在MITBBS攻击liberal主要是因为在加州被狂热小左恶心坏了；社会的健康发展更需要温和派之间的沟通合作。
: 政治光谱的问题，本来就是一个近似比喻，俺选择了一个比较传统而且不完全脱离现实的标尺。用这个模糊的标尺衡量完全不同的政治势力，只是表达大概意思而已，大家不必过于较真。
: 请不吝赐教！谢谢！
: 【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: : liberty rights和claim rights的区分是法学家Wesley Hohfeld在二十世纪初做出的，虽然迄今并未在法学界得到广泛应用，但为其辩护的人也不少，可以说自成一派，在政治学与法学界是绕不开的概念。楼主如果是业余玩票，犯些错误还情有可原，如果是专业人士，整篇文章可以说是有辱师门了。我这篇回复，前面一半澄清一下楼主
: : (以下引言省略...)
嗯，俺总算明白了Hohfeld这套liberty right vs. claim right体系，受教了！:) 就像您说的，这套体系里面的liberty right狭窄到了无用的程度，但可以维持逻辑的自洽并避免二重性。这个概念的确太绕，而且我看过的资料比如Wiki的某些解释很是误导。Wiki的liberty rights and claim rights词条里面“free speech”这个词语出现了两次，先作为liberty right再作为claim right，可以说这样的解释导致包括俺和lihlii这样的初级读者认为liberty right有两重性，也就认为财产支配权是Hohfeld体系内的liberty right了。如果您认为Wiki举的“free speech”的例子确实不妥，能否请您去Wiki改正一下，并且点明liberty right是一个极为狭窄的概念？Wiki的原话列在最下面，俺觉得“liberty right to free speech”的说法是不成立的，因为“free speech”已经被宪法确立为消极的claim right了。另外一个措词上的问题就是用permission这个词语来描述liberty right：permission隐含了通过口头或书面的“约定”来赋予许可的含义，即使不是成文约定也暗合自然法，落入了claim right这个筐，所以俺觉得这个词语和上面的例子一样是极为误导的。您怎么看？
最后，关于liberty right vs. claim right的问题，俺觉得还可以稍微深究一下：能不能这样说，所有的消极claim right都对应着传统意义上的自由（不是liberty right）？消极的claim就是外界不得干涉，那么权利的主体就是自由的。如果这个看法是正确的，那么消极claim right再加上现实中少得可怜的liberty right就构成了一个大类，积极的claim right则是另外一个大类，二者区别在于外界是否有积极义务。根据这个思路，全部的权利仍然可以分为两类：自由（传统含义），和利权（积极的claim确实是直接的利益）。如果这个分类方法在逻辑上正确，是不是与Mill的On Liberty里面的“群己权界”思想相合？基于这个自由与（积极）利权的分类，俺觉得俺原贴里面利权由自由经过契约衍生而来的思路尚且可以保持自洽。。。如果可以得到您老的背书俺就欢天喜地了:)
Wiki原文：
“For example, to assert a liberty right to free speech is to assert that you have permission to speak freely. But that liberty right does not in itself entail that others are obligated to help you communicate the things you wish to say, or even that they would be wrong in preventing you from speaking freely. To say these things would be to assert a claim right to free speech; to assert that others are obliged to refrain (i.e. prohibited) from preventing you from speaking freely (that is, that it would be wrong for them to do so) or even perhaps obliged to aid your efforts at communication (that is, it would be wrong for them to refuse such aid).”
wiki这段话说的并不是“free speech到底是liberty right，还是claim right”，而是“假如free speech是liberty right，后果将会怎样，假如它是claim right，后果又将会怎样”。
你后面那个区分，和密尔的群己权界关系不大，但是和positive duty vs. negative duty的争论倒是能联系上，你可以搜索一下这方面内容。不过你在这里用积极、消极的说法，容易和positive liberty vs. negative liberty（积极自由/消极自由）的区分混淆起来
【 在 stuartl (stewie) 的大作中提到: 】
: 嗯，俺总算明白了Hohfeld这套liberty right vs. claim right体系，受教了！:) 就像您说的，这套体系里面的liberty right狭窄到了无用的程度，但可以维持逻辑的自洽并避免二重性。这个概念的确太绕，而且我看过的资料比如Wiki的某些解释很是误导。Wiki的liberty rights and claim rights词条里面“free speech”这个词语出现了两次，先作为liberty right再作为claim right，可以说这样的解释导致包括俺和lihlii这样的初级读者认为liberty right有两重性，也就认为财产支配权是Hohfeld体系内的liberty right了。如果您认为Wiki举的“free speech”的例子确实不妥，能否请您去Wiki改正一下，并且点明liberty right是一个极为狭窄的概念？Wiki的原话列在最下面，俺觉得“liberty right to free speech”的说法是不成立的，因为“free speech”已经被宪法确立为消极的claim right了。另外一个措词上的问题就是用permission这个词语来描述liberty right：permission隐含了通过口头或书面的“约定”来赋予许可的含义，即使不是成文约定也暗合自然法，落入了claim right这个筐，所以俺觉得这个词语和上面的例子一样是极为误导的。您怎么看？
: 另外，您对开车权那句话的解释从字面上说得通但实际上没有任何考驾照的人或驾校教官会那样来理解。交通法规手册是有上下文的，lihlii的解释在上下文里显得很精确。
: 最后，关于liberty right vs. claim right的问题，俺觉得还可以稍微深究一下：能不能这样说，所有的消极claim right都对应着传统意义上的自由（不是liberty right）？消极的claim就是外界不得干涉，那么权利的主体就是自由的。如果这个看法是正确的，那么消极claim right再加上现实中少得可怜的liberty right就构成了一个大类，积极的claim right则是另外一个大类，二者区别在于外界是否有积极义务。根据这个思路，全部的权利仍然可以分为两类：自由（传统含义），和利权（积极的claim确实是直接的利益）。如果这个分类方法在逻辑上正确，是不是与Mill的On Liberty里面的“群己权界”思想相合？基于这个自由与（积极）利权的分类，俺觉得俺原贴里面利权由自由经过契约衍生而来的思路尚且可以保持自洽。。。如果可以得到您老的背书俺就欢天喜地了:)
: Wiki原文：
: “For example, to assert a liberty right to free speech is to assert that you have permission to speak freely. But that liberty right does not in itself entail that others are obligated to help you communicate the things you wish to say, or even that they would be wrong in preventing you from speaking freely. To say these things would be to assert a claim right to free speech; to assert that others are obliged to refrain (i.e. prohibited) from preventing you from speaking freely (that is, that it would be wrong for them to do so) or even perhaps obliged to aid your efforts at communication (that is, it would be wrong for them to refuse such aid).”
: 【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: : 多谢你的质疑。后面关于liberalism与libertarianism孰优孰劣的争论，涉及的内容太多，恐怕要以后单开题目讨论才行，我还是先说一下和概念有关的几个问题吧。
: : 首先，财产权是否涉及liberty rights？这点很明确：不涉及。因为在我具有私有产权的那部分物品上，我对其的任何处置都意味着其他个体或团体“不干涉我这种处置”的相应义务。举例说，假设我想把刚买的一本书撕下
: : (以下引言省略...)
我看了一遍 dikaios 的解说，认为他还是误解了什么是 liberty right 与 claim right。我坚持我先前的论点。
财产权，既有 liberty right 的属性，也有 claim right 的属性。liberty right 必然借助一种不得侵犯的否言表达，在这一理论层次上，把“不得侵犯”“允许 permission”被认为是 duty 义务，这是错误的。
为什么说财产权本来是一种 liberty right 呢？别人没有义务帮助你获得这一财产。比如，你种地赚钱，一般而言，别人没有任何义务帮你一定实现多少产量，获得相应的财产利权。
但是，在交易过程，借贷关系，产权转让（比如遗产继承）中，财产权就会以 claim right 的形态出现了。liberty right 和 claim right 是所有利权的两种属性。
言论自由的利权，也是一样的。言论自由主要是一种 liberty right，但是在某些情况下也是 claim right，比如，在一个理想的自由主义社会，社会必须给那些难以发言的弱势群体以扶助，以利于他们发言。这种情况下，弱势群体的言论自由，就是一种 claim right，他人有义务提供协助，否则会使得言论自由的 liberty right 受到侵害。
比如，教育权，就既是 liberty right，每个人有利权选择自己想要的教育；也是 claim right，比如义务教育法，父母和政府有义务给儿童提供教育服务。
claim right 所说的义务，不是这种否言表达的对利权不得侵犯的意义上的“义务”（我称之为二阶义务），而是用肯定式表达的，你应该还给我多少钱，应该向我支付多少钱，这种性质的义务。这是一阶义务。
lihlii，dikaios，俺今天总算静下心来重新把过去粗略读过的一些关于liberty rights vs. claim rights的资料看了一遍（甚至还到archive.org翻了一下Hohfeld的原著，只是没有时间看完）。其中一个资料里的一个概念，以前忽视了（当初根本就是跳着看，对这个细节好像没瞅几眼，太不应该！），现在感觉非常重要——molecular rights，指的是通常所说的某些权利在Hohfeld体系内具有多元成分（每一元称作atomic right），翻译为“复合权利”似乎比较好。这样的意思楼上几个帖子已经涉及了，这里专门谈一下。请打开下面的网页，看第2.1.6小节：
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/#2.1
这个网页专门举了一个“复合权利”的例子，恰恰就是财产权（a property right that you have over your computer）。根据作者的解释，物主对财物的使用权的确是liberty right，但“财产权”是复合权利，除了包括使用权所体现的liberty right成分，还包括财产占有权所体现的claim right成分，也和二级权利（对claim right的修改权和针对修改的豁免权）有关。二级权利通常只是潜在的可能而不被行使，而且这两个二级权利可以归并于广义的liberty right和claim right，所以上面的例子最重要的意思就是财产权作为复合权利的liberty right和claim right二重性。dikaios，俺觉得您或许是出于liberal意识形态才从第一个回帖到现在一直都在否认财产权的liberty right成分，以便把个人物主的财产权和政府对税收的claim right列为平级概念，但实际上个人财产权因为包含了liberty right而高于政府税收权（政府怎么使用税款，可以算作政府的liberty right，但受到社会契约的严格限制）。
【 在 lihlii 的大作中提到: 】
: 我看了一遍 dikaios 的解说，认为他还是误解了什么是 liberty right 与 claim right。我坚持我先前的论点。
: 财产权，既有 liberty right 的属性，也有 claim right 的属性。liberty right 必然借助一种不得侵犯的否言表达，在这一理论层次上，把“不得侵犯”“允许 permission”被认为是 duty 义务，这是错误的。
: (以下引言省略...)
思而不学则殆啊同志。。。
【为什么说财产权本来是一种 liberty right 呢？别人没有义务帮助你获得这一财产】。我前面说过了，“获得财产”和“财产权”是两件完全不同的事情。“获得财产”说的是把本来不是你财产的东西变为你的财产，而财产权说的是一个已经是你财产的东西你如何处置。获得财产的过程涉及的当然是liberty right（就像我前面说的捡无主硬币的例子），但这跟“财产权”没有任何关系
【否言表达的对利权不得侵犯的意义上的“义务”（我称之为二阶义务）】
不知道我们是在讨论Hohfeld的这套体系呢，还是在讨论你自创的体系？如果是前者，为什么不自己多看点书，好好想清楚再说话？如果是后者，恕我没兴趣奉陪
【 在 lihlii (立里) 的大作中提到: 】
: 我看了一遍 dikaios 的解说，认为他还是误解了什么是 liberty right 与 claim right。我坚持我先前的论点。
: 财产权，既有 liberty right 的属性，也有 claim right 的属性。liberty right 必然借助一种不得侵犯的否言表达，在这一理论层次上，把“不得侵犯”“允许 permission”被认为是 duty 义务，这是错误的。
: 为什么说财产权本来是一种 liberty right 呢？别人没有义务帮助你获得这一财产。比如，你种地赚钱，一般而言，别人没有任何义务帮你一定实现多少产量，获得相应的财产利权。
: 但是，在交易过程，借贷关系，产权转让（比如遗产继承）中，财产权就会以 claim right 的形态出现了。liberty right 和 claim right 是所有利权的两种属性。
: 言论自由的利权，也是一样的。言论自由主要是一种 liberty right，但是在某些情况下也是 claim right，比如，在一个理想的自由主义社会，社会必须给那些难以发言的弱势群体以扶助，以利于他们发言。这种情况下，弱势群体的言论自由，就是一种 claim right，他人有义务提供协助，否则会使得言论自由的 liberty right 受到侵害。
: 比如，教育权，就既是 liberty right，每个人有利权选择自己想要的教育；也是 claim right，比如义务教育法，父母和政府有义务给儿童提供教育服务。
: claim right 所说的义务，不是这种否言表达的对利权不得侵犯的意义上的“义务”（我称之为二阶义务），而是用肯定式表达的，你应该还给我多少钱，应该向我支付多少钱，这种性质的义务。这是一阶义务。
: 在概念的阶次上，参看 liberty right 和 claim right 也有一阶二阶之分。
: dikaios 的关于捡硬币的利权分析，也是很紊乱的。其次，硬币不可能是无主物，且不是一种实物（其价值并不等于其物理价值，而是一种债权信用凭证），所以这个例子也不是非常好。用在海滩捡贝壳做例子更清晰一些。
: 【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: : 言论自由和财产处置的区别，在于言论表达一定是主体间的——有“人”说，还得有“人”听才行。我有义务不干涉你“说”的自由，但我没有义务非“听”不可，在这种“说而不听”的状态，双方的行为相互不构成义务，于是存在liberty right。
: : 对处置财产可以分两种情况考察。一种情况是我这个“人”在处置一个“物”。这时其他人不管怎样都有义务不干
: : (以下引言省略...)
引文一（p.31）：“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called "agreement" of the parties, and the legal "contractual obligation" to which those facts give rise. Such ambiguity and confusion are peculiarly incident to the use of the term "contract." One moment the word may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a rapid and unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.”
Hohfeld批评了把“契约”和“责任”混同起来的做法，但隐含的意思是义务来自法律强制的背景下对契约的执行。Hohfeld写书的目的是澄清法学概念，所以这里的概念比较狭窄；如果脱离法律体系考虑最简单的民间个人之间的关系，义务仍然来自某种契约或约定。俺在这里把obligation和duty当作同义词，如果不妥请指正。
引文二（p.32）：“in the creation of a contractual obligation between A and B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of the parties is a human being...”
契约责任（和随之产生的权利义务关系）只存在于人与人之间（还有其他一些条件）。人对物的财产权是相对于其他人而言，不是相对于物而言。假如没有契约，那么人对物的占有只是行为，不是权利。这本书的第二部分专门论述了这个议题，就不另外引述了。
引文三（p.38-39）：“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place...
“whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the hind, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point; for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty, — for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege; — but it still holds good that, as regards Y. X's privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off.
“Passing now to the question of "correlatives." it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not
enter.”
上面这些引文非常重要，因为涉及了财产权（土地使用权），也涉及了相依性（correlative）：一，X对土地的占有权是claim right（Hohfeld称之为right），相依/等同于Y不得进入的义务；二，X进入自家土地这一使用权是liberty right（Hohfeld称之为privilege）但进不进去随他自己、他只是没有不进去的义务；三，如果X和Y之间有一个专门的契约要求X进入自家土地，X就有了进入的义务，但这是相对于Y依据后一个契约（和财产权无关）要求X进入自家土地的claim right而言的；四，X进入自家土地的liberty right（privilege）相依/等同于Y无权禁止X这样做，这是Y的“无要求”（no-right），针对X对土地的财产权而言。
引文四（p.41-42）“"The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and. if I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for..."
“This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of relations: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C, D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective "no-rights" of A, B, C, D and others that the party should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or claims) as against A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective duties of A. B, C, D and others that they should not interfere.
...
“Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinction can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence, fundamentally different from
the relation between X and A. As regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad ; but as regards either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been extinguished.”
花钱买的沙拉是购买者的财产，所伴随的财产权包含两个成分：吃沙拉，作为使用权是liberty right（privilege）；不让别人干涉自己吃沙拉，作为占有权是claim right（Hohfeld总算在这里用了claim这个词）。购买者（X）可以和Y达成契约保证自己不吃这盘沙拉，也就是放弃了自己这份财产的使用权，但相对于Y以外的别人，X仍然有使用权，而且对于包括Y在内的所有的外人，X即使不使用财产也仍然有占有权。
引文五（p.60）：“X, the owner of a watch, has the power to abandon his property — that is, to extinguish his existing rights, powers, and immunities relating thereto (not, however, his privileges, for until someone else has acquired title to the abandoned watch, X would have the same privileges as before) ; and correlatively to X's power of abandonment there is a liability in every other person. But such a liability instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite. As regards another person, M, for example, it is a liability to have created in his favor (though against his will) a privilege and a power relating to the watch, — that is, the privilege of taking possession and the power, by doing so, to vest a title in himself.”
Hohfeld花费了极长的篇幅详细论述了和财产权有关的二级权利，但咱们在这个问题上没有分歧，所以就不多说了；上面这段引文有意思的地方就是在二级权利的上下文之内涉及了财产权的liberty right成分（X使用手表的privilege）。还谈到M获得手表的privilege，但这是获得财产的权利，不属于通常意义上的财产权，而属于经济自由，或者“追求幸福”的自由。M获得这块手表的liberty right（privilege）原本不存在，被X的power修订之后才产生。从权利之起源的角度来考虑，假如没有社会契约，M原本有更大的liberty right——抢夺或偷窃原属于X的手表——但社会契约之下这些伦理上的“假自由”（逻辑上仍然是真自由）必须被让渡，所以正常情况下M对这块手表没有liberty right，除非依赖X的power。
引文六（p.76-77）“Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the Owner of Whiteacre... as regards Blackacre, A has besides his rights, or claims, against B. C. D. E, and others, various legal privileges of controlling and using the land, and that these exist "to, over, or against" the land.”
Hohfeld著作的第二部分论述了相对于少数个体的权利（right in personam，或paucital right，比如两个人之间的契约所决定的权利）和相对于庞大群体的权利（right in rem，或multital right，比如财产占有权，任何他人不得侵犯），在这个上下文中仍然涉及物主控制和使用财产的liberty right（privilege）。
引文七（p.92-94）：“"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally as a right good against all the world, actual instances of such ownership are often much more narrowly limited..." instead of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person. Repeating a hypothetical case put above, let us suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre... B, C, D, and others indefinitely... respectively considered, shall not enter on Blackacre. It is not a case of one joint duty of the same content resting on all... Consistently with this view, A might, e.g., extinguish B's duty or, in other words, grant B the privilege of entering by giving "leave and license" to do so. In such event, of course, the respective duties of C, D, E, and all others would continue to exist, precisely as before.”
上面这段话的目的是进一步解析“相对于庞大群体的权利”（right in rem，或multital right）的精微含义，但也涉及财产权的例子：A给予B进入A的土地的liberty right（privilege）。这里的“grant”就是二级权利power，修改了原先的一级权利（假如没有任何契约也就没有财产占有权，B随便去哪里都可以，包括Blackacre；在社会契约和产权契约之下B失去了进入A的土地Blackacre的自由；现在A又运用自己作为物主的power把这个自由重新赋予B）。
引文八（p.96-97）“A multital right, or claim (right in rem), should not be confused with any co-existing privileges or other jural relations that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect to the same subject-matter... A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, using
the land, harming the land, etc., that is, within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases ; and correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other persons... In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, multital, or in rem, "right — duty" relations, multital, or in rem, "privilege — no-right" relations, multital, or in rem, "power — liability" relations, and multital, or in rem, "immunity — disability" relations... A's privileges, e.g., are strikingly independent of his rights or claims against any given person, and either might exist without the other.”
基本上是在重复早先的东西，但明确列出了财产权的两个一级权利（包括privilege）和两个二级权利。全书总共114页，俺看到最后也没有找出哪一处否定了财产权具有liberty right成分；相反，Hohfeld逻辑性极强，全书前后自洽。
关于当代学者的论点，俺是业余票友，难以查阅社科文献，所以只好借助网络和图书馆。Peter Jones能否算作有影响力的学者？他1994年出版的Rights一书详细讨论了Hohfeld体系（开篇第一章就是这个话题，俺只看了这一章），俺在网上读过的一些资料也引用或转述了Jones的观点。下面是Jones在Rights书中的原话，和Hohfeld原著以及俺昨天提供的斯坦佛大学网站上的说法是完全一致的：“if I have a property right in a car, that right is likely to consist of a complicated cluster of Hohfeldian rights. Typically these would include the claim-right that others should refrain from damaging my car or using it without my permission, my liberty-right as owner of the car to use the car, the power to sell the car or to permit others to use it, and my immunity from any power of others to dispose of the car without my consent. In other words, a single assertion of right might, on inspection, turn out to be a cluster of different types of right.” 当然，您可以说Jones没有真正理解Hohfeld。俺没有找到专门论证财产权不具有liberty right成分的文章，可以说俺在网上看过的所有的涉及财产权的资料都或者像Jones一样明确说明财物使用权是liberty right，或者没有涉及这个细节。
引文一（p.31）：“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called "agreement" of the parties, and the legal "contractual obligation" to which those facts give rise. Such ambiguity and confusion are peculiarly incident to the use of the term "contract." One moment the word may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a rapid and unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.”
Hohfeld批评了把“契约”和“责任”混同起来的做法，但隐含的意思是义务来自法律强制的背景下对契约的执行。Hohfeld写书的目的是澄清法学概念，所以这里的概念比较狭窄；如果脱离法律体系考虑最简单的民间个人之间的关系，义务仍然来自某种契约或约定。俺在这里把obligation和duty当作同义词，如果不妥请指正。
引文二（p.32）：“in the creation of a contractual obligation between A and B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of the parties is a human being...”
契约责任（和随之产生的权利义务关系）只存在于人与人之间（还有其他一些条件）。人对物的财产权是相对于其他人而言，不是相对于物而言。假如没有契约，那么人对物的占有只是行为，不是权利。这本书的第二部分专门论述了这个议题，就不另外引述了。
引文三（p.38-39）：“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place...
“whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the hind, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point; for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty, — for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege; — but it still holds good that, as regards Y. X's privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off.
“Passing now to the question of "correlatives." it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not
enter.”
上面这些引文非常重要，因为涉及了财产权（土地使用权），也涉及了相依性（correlative）：一，X对土地的占有权是claim right（Hohfeld称之为right），相依/等同于Y不得进入的义务；二，X进入自家土地这一使用权是liberty right（Hohfeld称之为privilege）但进不进去随他自己、他只是没有不进去的义务；三，如果X和Y之间有一个专门的契约要求X进入自家土地，X就有了进入的义务，但这是相对于Y依据后一个契约（和财产权无关）要求X进入自家土地的claim right而言的；四，X进入自家土地的liberty right（privilege）相依/等同于Y无权禁止X这样做，这是Y的“无要求”（no-right），针对X对土地的财产权而言。
引文四（p.41-42）“"The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and. if I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for..."
“This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of relations: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C, D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective "no-rights" of A, B, C, D and others that the party should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or claims) as against A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective duties of A. B, C, D and others that they should not interfere.
...
“Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinction can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence, fundamentally different from
the relation between X and A. As regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad ; but as regards either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been extinguished.”
花钱买的沙拉是购买者的财产，所伴随的财产权包含两个成分：吃沙拉，作为使用权是liberty right（privilege）；不让别人干涉自己吃沙拉，作为占有权是claim right（Hohfeld总算在这里用了claim这个词）。购买者（X）可以和Y达成契约保证自己不吃这盘沙拉，也就是放弃了自己这份财产的使用权，但相对于Y以外的别人，X仍然有使用权，而且对于包括Y在内的所有的外人，X即使不使用财产也仍然有占有权。
引文五（p.60）：“X, the owner of a watch, has the power to abandon his property — that is, to extinguish his existing rights, powers, and immunities relating thereto (not, however, his privileges, for until someone else has acquired title to the abandoned watch, X would have the same privileges as before) ; and correlatively to X's power of abandonment there is a liability in every other person. But such a liability instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite. As regards another person, M, for example, it is a liability to have created in his favor (though against his will) a privilege and a power relating to the watch, — that is, the privilege of taking possession and the power, by doing so, to vest a title in himself.”
Hohfeld花费了极长的篇幅详细论述了和财产权有关的二级权利，但咱们在这个问题上没有分歧，所以就不多说了；上面这段引文有意思的地方就是在二级权利的上下文之内涉及了财产权的liberty right成分（X使用手表的privilege）。还谈到M获得手表的privilege，但这是获得财产的权利，不属于通常意义上的财产权，而属于经济自由，或者“追求幸福”的自由。M获得这块手表的liberty right（privilege）原本不存在，被X的power修订之后才产生。从权利之起源的角度来考虑，假如没有社会契约，M原本有更大的liberty right——抢夺或偷窃原属于X的手表——但社会契约之下这些伦理上的“假自由”（逻辑上仍然是真自由）必须被让渡，所以正常情况下M对这块手表没有liberty right，除非依赖X的power。
引文六（p.76-77）“Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the Owner of Whiteacre... as regards Blackacre, A has besides his rights, or claims, against B. C. D. E, and others, various legal privileges of controlling and using the land, and that these exist "to, over, or against" the land.”
Hohfeld著作的第二部分论述了相对于少数个体的权利（right in personam，或paucital right，比如两个人之间的契约所决定的权利）和相对于庞大群体的权利（right in rem，或multital right，比如财产占有权，任何他人不得侵犯），在这个上下文中仍然涉及物主控制和使用财产的liberty right（privilege）。
引文七（p.92-94）：“"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally as a right good against all the world, actual instances of such ownership are often much more narrowly limited..." instead of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person. Repeating a hypothetical case put above, let us suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre... B, C, D, and others indefinitely... respectively considered, shall not enter on Blackacre. It is not a case of one joint duty of the same content resting on all... Consistently with this view, A might, e.g., extinguish B's duty or, in other words, grant B the privilege of entering by giving "leave and license" to do so. In such event, of course, the respective duties of C, D, E, and all others would continue to exist, precisely as before.”
上面这段话的目的是进一步解析“相对于庞大群体的权利”（right in rem，或multital right）的精微含义，但也涉及财产权的例子：A给予B进入A的土地的liberty right（privilege）。这里的“grant”就是二级权利power，修改了原先的一级权利（假如没有任何契约也就没有财产占有权，B随便去哪里都可以，包括Blackacre；在社会契约和产权契约之下B失去了进入A的土地Blackacre的自由；现在A又运用自己作为物主的power把这个自由重新赋予B）。
引文八（p.96-97）“A multital right, or claim (right in rem), should not be confused with any co-existing privileges or other jural relations that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect to the same subject-matter... A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, using
the land, harming the land, etc., that is, within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases ; and correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other persons... In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, multital, or in rem, "right — duty" relations, multital, or in rem, "privilege — no-right" relations, multital, or in rem, "power — liability" relations, and multital, or in rem, "immunity — disability" relations... A's privileges, e.g., are strikingly independent of his rights or claims against any given person, and either might exist without the other.”
基本上是在重复早先的东西，但明确列出了财产权的两个一级权利（包括privilege）和两个二级权利。全书总共114页，俺看到最后也没有找出哪一处否定了财产权具有liberty right成分；相反，Hohfeld逻辑性极强，全书前后自洽。
关于当代学者的论点，俺是业余票友，难以查阅社科文献，所以只好借助网络和图书馆。Peter Jones能否算作有影响力的学者？他1994年出版的Rights一书详细讨论了Hohfeld体系（开篇第一章就是这个话题，俺只看了这一章），俺在网上读过的一些资料也引用或转述了Jones的观点。下面是Jones在Rights书中的原话，和Hohfeld原著以及俺昨天提供的斯坦佛大学网站上的说法是完全一致的：“if I have a property right in a car, that right is likely to consist of a complicated cluster of Hohfeldian rights. Typically these would include the claim-right that others should refrain from damaging my car or using it without my permission, my liberty-right as owner of the car to use the car, the power to sell the car or to permit others to use it, and my immunity from any power of others to dispose of the car without my consent. In other words, a single assertion of right might, on inspection, turn out to be a cluster of different types of right.” 当然，您可以说Jones没有真正理解Hohfeld。俺没有找到专门论证财产权不具有liberty right成分的文章，可以说俺在网上看过的所有的涉及财产权的资料都或者像Jones一样明确说明财物使用权是liberty right，或者没有涉及这个细节。
引文一（p.31）：“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called "agreement" of the parties, and the legal "contractual obligation" to which those facts give rise. Such ambiguity and confusion are peculiarly incident to the use of the term "contract." One moment the word may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a rapid and unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.”
Hohfeld批评了把“契约”和“责任”混同起来的做法，但隐含的意思是义务来自法律强制的背景下对契约的执行。Hohfeld写书的目的是澄清法学概念，所以这里的概念比较狭窄；如果脱离法律体系考虑最简单的民间个人之间的关系，义务仍然来自某种契约或约定。俺在这里把obligation和duty当作同义词，如果不妥请指正。
引文二（p.32）：“in the creation of a contractual obligation between A and B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of the parties is a human being...”
契约责任（和随之产生的权利义务关系）只存在于人与人之间（还有其他一些条件）。人对物的财产权是相对于其他人而言，不是相对于物而言。假如没有契约，那么人对物的占有只是行为，不是权利。这本书的第二部分专门论述了这个议题，就不另外引述了。
引文三（p.38-39）：“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place...
“whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the hind, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point; for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty, — for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege; — but it still holds good that, as regards Y. X's privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off.
“Passing now to the question of "correlatives." it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not
enter.”
上面这些引文非常重要，因为涉及了财产权（土地使用权），也涉及了相依性（correlative）：一，X对土地的占有权是claim right（Hohfeld称之为right），相依/等同于Y不得进入的义务；二，X进入自家土地这一使用权是liberty right（Hohfeld称之为privilege）但进不进去随他自己、他只是没有不进去的义务；三，如果X和Y之间有一个专门的契约要求X进入自家土地，X就有了进入的义务，但这是相对于Y依据后一个契约（和财产权无关）要求X进入自家土地的claim right而言的；四，X进入自家土地的liberty right（privilege）相依/等同于Y无权禁止X这样做，这是Y的“无要求”（no-right），针对X对土地的财产权而言。
引文四（p.41-42）“"The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and. if I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for..."
“This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of relations: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C, D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective "no-rights" of A, B, C, D and others that the party should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or claims) as against A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective duties of A. B, C, D and others that they should not interfere.
...
“Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinction can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence, fundamentally different from
the relation between X and A. As regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad ; but as regards either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been extinguished.”
花钱买的沙拉是购买者的财产，所伴随的财产权包含两个成分：吃沙拉，作为使用权是liberty right（privilege）；不让别人干涉自己吃沙拉，作为占有权是claim right（Hohfeld总算在这里用了claim这个词）。购买者（X）可以和Y达成契约保证自己不吃这盘沙拉，也就是放弃了自己这份财产的使用权，但相对于Y以外的别人，X仍然有使用权，而且对于包括Y在内的所有的外人，X即使不使用财产也仍然有占有权。
引文五（p.60）：“X, the owner of a watch, has the power to abandon his property — that is, to extinguish his existing rights, powers, and immunities relating thereto (not, however, his privileges, for until someone else has acquired title to the abandoned watch, X would have the same privileges as before) ; and correlatively to X's power of abandonment there is a liability in every other person. But such a liability instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite. As regards another person, M, for example, it is a liability to have created in his favor (though against his will) a privilege and a power relating to the watch, — that is, the privilege of taking possession and the power, by doing so, to vest a title in himself.”
Hohfeld花费了极长的篇幅详细论述了和财产权有关的二级权利，但咱们在这个问题上没有分歧，所以就不多说了；上面这段引文有意思的地方就是在二级权利的上下文之内涉及了财产权的liberty right成分（X使用手表的privilege）。还谈到M获得手表的privilege，但这是获得财产的权利，不属于通常意义上的财产权，而属于经济自由，或者“追求幸福”的自由。M获得这块手表的liberty right（privilege）原本不存在，被X的power修订之后才产生。从权利之起源的角度来考虑，假如没有社会契约，M原本有更大的liberty right——抢夺或偷窃原属于X的手表——但社会契约之下这些伦理上的“假自由”（逻辑上仍然是真自由）必须被让渡，所以正常情况下M对这块手表没有liberty right，除非依赖X的power。
引文六（p.76-77）“Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the Owner of Whiteacre... as regards Blackacre, A has besides his rights, or claims, against B. C. D. E, and others, various legal privileges of controlling and using the land, and that these exist "to, over, or against" the land.”
Hohfeld著作的第二部分论述了相对于少数个体的权利（right in personam，或paucital right，比如两个人之间的契约所决定的权利）和相对于庞大群体的权利（right in rem，或multital right，比如财产占有权，任何他人不得侵犯），在这个上下文中仍然涉及物主控制和使用财产的liberty right（privilege）。
引文七（p.92-94）：“"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally as a right good against all the world, actual instances of such ownership are often much more narrowly limited..." instead of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person. Repeating a hypothetical case put above, let us suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre... B, C, D, and others indefinitely... respectively considered, shall not enter on Blackacre. It is not a case of one joint duty of the same content resting on all... Consistently with this view, A might, e.g., extinguish B's duty or, in other words, grant B the privilege of entering by giving "leave and license" to do so. In such event, of course, the respective duties of C, D, E, and all others would continue to exist, precisely as before.”
上面这段话的目的是进一步解析“相对于庞大群体的权利”（right in rem，或multital right）的精微含义，但也涉及财产权的例子：A给予B进入A的土地的liberty right（privilege）。这里的“grant”就是二级权利power，修改了原先的一级权利（假如没有任何契约也就没有财产占有权，B随便去哪里都可以，包括Blackacre；在社会契约和产权契约之下B失去了进入A的土地Blackacre的自由；现在A又运用自己作为物主的power把这个自由重新赋予B）。
引文八（p.96-97）“A multital right, or claim (right in rem), should not be confused with any co-existing privileges or other jural relations that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect to the same subject-matter... A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, using
the land, harming the land, etc., that is, within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases ; and correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other persons... In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, multital, or in rem, "right — duty" relations, multital, or in rem, "privilege — no-right" relations, multital, or in rem, "power — liability" relations, and multital, or in rem, "immunity — disability" relations... A's privileges, e.g., are strikingly independent of his rights or claims against any given person, and either might exist without the other.”
基本上是在重复早先的东西，但明确列出了财产权的两个一级权利（包括privilege）和两个二级权利。全书总共114页，俺看到最后也没有找出哪一处否定了财产权具有liberty right成分；相反，Hohfeld逻辑性极强，全书前后自洽。
关于当代学者的论点，俺是业余票友，难以查阅社科文献，所以只好借助网络和图书馆。Peter Jones能否算作有影响力的学者？他1994年出版的Rights一书详细讨论了Hohfeld体系（开篇第一章就是这个话题，俺只看了这一章），俺在网上读过的一些资料也引用或转述了Jones的观点。下面是Jones在Rights书中的原话，和Hohfeld原著以及俺昨天提供的斯坦佛大学网站上的说法是完全一致的：“if I have a property right in a car, that right is likely to consist of a complicated cluster of Hohfeldian rights. Typically these would include the claim-right that others should refrain from damaging my car or using it without my permission, my liberty-right as owner of the car to use the car, the power to sell the car or to permit others to use it, and my immunity from any power of others to dispose of the car without my consent. In other words, a single assertion of right might, on inspection, turn out to be a cluster of different types of right.” 当然，您可以说Jones没有真正理解Hohfeld。俺没有找到专门论证财产权不具有liberty right成分的文章，可以说俺在网上看过的所有的涉及财产权的资料都或者像Jones一样明确说明财物使用权是liberty right，或者没有涉及这个细节。
谢谢给出原文，看来我在这点上的确错了，可能是混淆了后来某些人的修正和Hohfeld的原意，很抱歉（Hohfeld的原著以及法学界相关争论是很早以前读的，和我后来的方向没有什么联系，而我又比较同意批评者认为这种体系用处不大的观点，加上这次回帖时手头没有参考书，细节上果然出问题了，惭愧惭愧）。等我回学校以后再找找关于在财产权有无liberty rights方面修正Hohfeld体系的相关文献吧。
道歉之后，我想补充说明的是，即便财产权包括liberty rights，这并未削弱我一开始回帖时所说的，不应当把征税理解为liberty right与claim right两者之间的交换。既然财产权中总是同时存在liberty right与claim right两种权利，我在把一部分财产作为税金上缴国库的时候，自然同时放弃了对这部分财产的liberty right与claim right，这其中并不存在两者的交换与冲突。从更大的层面说，用Hohfeld的框架去理解自由主义与自由至上主义之间的争论是不恰当的，这是我一开始的重点所在
【 在 stuartl (stewie) 的大作中提到: 】
: 俺在archive.org读了Hohfeld的原著，不敢自称完全消化了，只是完全不觉得后文的correlation把liberty right的成分排除在财产权之外。Hohfeld论述的correlatives（原文好像没有用correlation这个词）主要指的是权利范畴内的一些基本概念之间的相依性（如甲方claim right和乙方duty）。下面是一些Hohfeld的原话和俺粗浅的理解，涉及契约，liberty right（privilege），和财产权：
: 引文一（p.31）：“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called "agreement" of the parties, and the legal "contractual obligation" to which those facts give rise. Such ambiguity and confusion are peculiarly incident to the use of the term "contract." One moment the word may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a rapid and unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.”
: Hohfeld批评了把“契约”和“责任”混同起来的做法，但隐含的意思是义务来自法律强制的背景下对契约的执行。Hohfeld写书的目的是澄清法学概念，所以这里的概念比较狭窄；如果脱离法律体系考虑最简单的民间个人之间的关系，义务仍然来自某种契约或约定。俺在这里把obligation和duty当作同义词，如果不妥请指正。
: 引文二（p.32）：“in the creation of a contractual obligation between A and B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of the parties is a human being...”
: 契约责任（和随之产生的权利义务关系）只存在于人与人之间（还有其他一些条件）。人对物的财产权是相对于其他人而言，不是相对于物而言。假如没有契约，那么人对物的占有只是行为，不是权利。这本书的第二部分专门论述了这个议题，就不另外引述了。
: 引文三（p.38-39）：“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place...
: “whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the hind, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point; for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty, — for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege; — but it still holds good that, as regards Y. X's privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off.
: “Passing now to the question of "correlatives." it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not
: enter.”
: 上面这些引文非常重要，因为涉及了财产权（土地使用权），也涉及了相依性（correlative）：一，X对土地的占有权是claim right（Hohfeld称之为right），相依/等同于Y不得进入的义务；二，X进入自家土地这一使用权是liberty right（Hohfeld称之为privilege）但进不进去随他自己、他只是没有不进去的义务；三，如果X和Y之间有一个专门的契约要求X进入自家土地，X就有了进入的义务，但这是相对于Y依据后一个契约（和财产权无关）要求X进入自家土地的claim right而言的；四，X进入自家土地的liberty right（privilege）相依/等同于Y无权禁止X这样做，这是Y的“无要求”（no-right），针对X对土地的财产权而言。
: 引文四（p.41-42）“"The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and. if I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for..."
: “This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of relations: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C, D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective "no-rights" of A, B, C, D and others that the party should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or claims) as against A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective duties of A. B, C, D and others that they should not interfere.
: ...
: “Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinction can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence, fundamentally different from
: the relation between X and A. As regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad ; but as regards either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been extinguished.”
: 花钱买的沙拉是购买者的财产，所伴随的财产权包含两个成分：吃沙拉，作为使用权是liberty right（privilege）；不让别人干涉自己吃沙拉，作为占有权是claim right（Hohfeld总算在这里用了claim这个词）。购买者（X）可以和Y达成契约保证自己不吃这盘沙拉，也就是放弃了自己这份财产的使用权，但相对于Y以外的别人，X仍然有使用权，而且对于包括Y在内的所有的外人，X即使不使用财产也仍然有占有权。
: 引文五（p.60）：“X, the owner of a watch, has the power to abandon his property — that is, to extinguish his existing rights, powers, and immunities relating thereto (not, however, his privileges, for until someone else has acquired title to the abandoned watch, X would have the same privileges as before) ; and correlatively to X's power of abandonment there is a liability in every other person. But such a liability instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite. As regards another person, M, for example, it is a liability to have created in his favor (though against his will) a privilege and a power relating to the watch, — that is, the privilege of taking possession and the power, by doing so, to vest a title in himself.”
: Hohfeld花费了极长的篇幅详细论述了和财产权有关的二级权利，但咱们在这个问题上没有分歧，所以就不多说了；上面这段引文有意思的地方就是在二级权利的上下文之内涉及了财产权的liberty right成分（X使用手表的privilege）。还谈到M获得手表的privilege，但这是获得财产的权利，不属于通常意义上的财产权，而属于经济自由，或者“追求幸福”的自由。M获得这块手表的liberty right（privilege）原本不存在，被X的power修订之后才产生。从权利之起源的角度来考虑，假如没有社会契约，M原本有更大的liberty right——抢夺或偷窃原属于X的手表——但社会契约之下这些伦理上的“假自由”（逻辑上仍然是真自由）必须被让渡，所以正常情况下M对这块手表没有liberty right，除非依赖X的power。
: 引文六（p.76-77）“Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the Owner of Whiteacre... as regards Blackacre, A has besides his rights, or claims, against B. C. D. E, and others, various legal privileges of controlling and using the land, and that these exist "to, over, or against" the land.”
: Hohfeld著作的第二部分论述了相对于少数个体的权利（right in personam，或paucital right，比如两个人之间的契约所决定的权利）和相对于庞大群体的权利（right in rem，或multital right，比如财产占有权，任何他人不得侵犯），在这个上下文中仍然涉及物主控制和使用财产的liberty right（privilege）。
: 引文七（p.92-94）：“"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally as a right good against all the world, actual instances of such ownership are often much more narrowly limited..." instead of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person. Repeating a hypothetical case put above, let us suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre... B, C, D, and others indefinitely... respectively considered, shall not enter on Blackacre. It is not a case of one joint duty of the same content resting on all... Consistently with this view, A might, e.g., extinguish B's duty or, in other words, grant B the privilege of entering by giving "leave and license" to do so. In such event, of course, the respective duties of C, D, E, and all others would continue to exist, precisely as before.”
: 上面这段话的目的是进一步解析“相对于庞大群体的权利”（right in rem，或multital right）的精微含义，但也涉及财产权的例子：A给予B进入A的土地的liberty right（privilege）。这里的“grant”就是二级权利power，修改了原先的一级权利（假如没有任何契约也就没有财产占有权，B随便去哪里都可以，包括Blackacre；在社会契约和产权契约之下B失去了进入A的土地Blackacre的自由；现在A又运用自己作为物主的power把这个自由重新赋予B）。
: 引文八（p.96-97）“A multital right, or claim (right in rem), should not be confused with any co-existing privileges or other jural relations that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect to the same subject-matter... A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, using
: the land, harming the land, etc., that is, within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases ; and correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other persons... In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, multital, or in rem, "right — duty" relations, multital, or in rem, "privilege — no-right" relations, multital, or in rem, "power — liability" relations, and multital, or in rem, "immunity — disability" relations... A's privileges, e.g., are strikingly independent of his rights or claims against any given person, and either might exist without the other.”
: 基本上是在重复早先的东西，但明确列出了财产权的两个一级权利（包括privilege）和两个二级权利。全书总共114页，俺看到最后也没有找出哪一处否定了财产权具有liberty right成分；相反，Hohfeld逻辑性极强，全书前后自洽。
: 关于当代学者的论点，俺是业余票友，难以查阅社科文献，所以只好借助网络和图书馆。Peter Jones能否算作有影响力的学者？他1994年出版的Rights一书详细讨论了Hohfeld体系（开篇第一章就是这个话题，俺只看了这一章），俺在网上读过的一些资料也引用或转述了Jones的观点。下面是Jones在Rights书中的原话，和Hohfeld原著以及俺昨天提供的斯坦佛大学网站上的说法是完全一致的：“if I have a property right in a car, that right is likely to consist of a complicated cluster of Hohfeldian rights. Typically these would include the claim-right that others should refrain from damaging my car or using it without my permission, my liberty-right as owner of the car to use the car, the power to sell the car or to permit others to use it, and my immunity from any power of others to dispose of the car without my consent. In other words, a single assertion of right might, on inspection, turn out to be a cluster of different types of right.” 当然，您可以说Jones没有真正理解Hohfeld。俺没有找到专门论证财产权不具有liberty right成分的文章，可以说俺在网上看过的所有的涉及财产权的资料都或者像Jones一样明确说明财物使用权是liberty right，或者没有涉及这个细节。
: 总而言之，财产权作为复合权利具有liberty right的成分，是Hohfeld的原始观点；您说后来有人把财产权的使用权成分也当作claim right，这种新理论推翻了Hohfeld体系的重要论点，而不是顺延发挥、在Hohfeld理论框架内阐述Hohfeld没有涉足的领域。Hohfeld英年早逝，咱们无法猜测他是否会接受这种新理论，但俺认为Hohfeld理论是正确的，那种新理论不是“修正”而是歪曲。谁能提供否定财产权具有liberty right成分的学术论文？俺很想看看这种新理论是怎样推导出来的。
: 【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: : 法学界误以为property rights包括liberty rights也不乏其人，这不希奇，因为Hohfeld的原文是先讨论各个概念的opposition（我有做某件事的liberty right /privilege /permission，意味着我没有不做这件事的duty），过了几节后才讨论各个概念的correlation（我有做某件事的liberty right /privilege /permission，意味着别人
: : 关于property rights在Hohfeld的框架下究竟应当如何理
: : (以下引言省略...)
谢谢给出原文，看来我在这点上的确错了，可能是混淆了后来某些人的修正和Hohfeld的原意，很抱歉（Hohfeld的原著以及法学界相关争论是很早以前读的，和我后来的方向没有什么联系，而我又比较同意批评者认为这种体系用处不大的观点，加上这次回帖时手头没有参考书，细节上果然出问题了，惭愧惭愧）。等我回学校以后再找找关于在财产权有无liberty rights方面修正Hohfeld体系的相关文献吧。
道歉之后，我想补充说明的是，即便财产权包括liberty rights，这并未削弱我一开始回帖时所说的，不应当把征税理解为liberty right与claim right两者之间的交换。既然财产权中总是同时存在liberty right与claim right两种权利，我在把一部分财产作为税金上缴国库的时候，自然同时放弃了对这部分财产的liberty right与claim right，这其中并不存在两者的交换与冲突。从更大的层面说，用Hohfeld的框架去理解自由主义与自由至上主义之间的争论是不恰当的，这是我一开始的重点所在
【 在 stuartl (stewie) 的大作中提到: 】
: 俺在archive.org读了Hohfeld的原著，不敢自称完全消化了，只是完全不觉得后文的correlation把liberty right的成分排除在财产权之外。Hohfeld论述的correlatives（原文好像没有用correlation这个词）主要指的是权利范畴内的一些基本概念之间的相依性（如甲方claim right和乙方duty）。下面是一些Hohfeld的原话和俺粗浅的理解，涉及契约，liberty right（privilege），和财产权：
: 引文一（p.31）：“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called "agreement" of the parties, and the legal "contractual obligation" to which those facts give rise. Such ambiguity and confusion are peculiarly incident to the use of the term "contract." One moment the word may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a rapid and unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.”
: Hohfeld批评了把“契约”和“责任”混同起来的做法，但隐含的意思是义务来自法律强制的背景下对契约的执行。Hohfeld写书的目的是澄清法学概念，所以这里的概念比较狭窄；如果脱离法律体系考虑最简单的民间个人之间的关系，义务仍然来自某种契约或约定。俺在这里把obligation和duty当作同义词，如果不妥请指正。
: 引文二（p.32）：“in the creation of a contractual obligation between A and B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of the parties is a human being...”
: 契约责任（和随之产生的权利义务关系）只存在于人与人之间（还有其他一些条件）。人对物的财产权是相对于其他人而言，不是相对于物而言。假如没有契约，那么人对物的占有只是行为，不是权利。这本书的第二部分专门论述了这个议题，就不另外引述了。
: 引文三（p.38-39）：“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place...
: “whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the hind, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point; for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty, — for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege; — but it still holds good that, as regards Y. X's privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off.
: “Passing now to the question of "correlatives." it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not
: enter.”
: 上面这些引文非常重要，因为涉及了财产权（土地使用权），也涉及了相依性（correlative）：一，X对土地的占有权是claim right（Hohfeld称之为right），相依/等同于Y不得进入的义务；二，X进入自家土地这一使用权是liberty right（Hohfeld称之为privilege）但进不进去随他自己、他只是没有不进去的义务；三，如果X和Y之间有一个专门的契约要求X进入自家土地，X就有了进入的义务，但这是相对于Y依据后一个契约（和财产权无关）要求X进入自家土地的claim right而言的；四，X进入自家土地的liberty right（privilege）相依/等同于Y无权禁止X这样做，这是Y的“无要求”（no-right），针对X对土地的财产权而言。
: 引文四（p.41-42）“"The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and. if I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for..."
: “This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of relations: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C, D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective "no-rights" of A, B, C, D and others that the party should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or claims) as against A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective duties of A. B, C, D and others that they should not interfere.
: ...
: “Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinction can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence, fundamentally different from
: the relation between X and A. As regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad ; but as regards either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been extinguished.”
: 花钱买的沙拉是购买者的财产，所伴随的财产权包含两个成分：吃沙拉，作为使用权是liberty right（privilege）；不让别人干涉自己吃沙拉，作为占有权是claim right（Hohfeld总算在这里用了claim这个词）。购买者（X）可以和Y达成契约保证自己不吃这盘沙拉，也就是放弃了自己这份财产的使用权，但相对于Y以外的别人，X仍然有使用权，而且对于包括Y在内的所有的外人，X即使不使用财产也仍然有占有权。
: 引文五（p.60）：“X, the owner of a watch, has the power to abandon his property — that is, to extinguish his existing rights, powers, and immunities relating thereto (not, however, his privileges, for until someone else has acquired title to the abandoned watch, X would have the same privileges as before) ; and correlatively to X's power of abandonment there is a liability in every other person. But such a liability instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite. As regards another person, M, for example, it is a liability to have created in his favor (though against his will) a privilege and a power relating to the watch, — that is, the privilege of taking possession and the power, by doing so, to vest a title in himself.”
: Hohfeld花费了极长的篇幅详细论述了和财产权有关的二级权利，但咱们在这个问题上没有分歧，所以就不多说了；上面这段引文有意思的地方就是在二级权利的上下文之内涉及了财产权的liberty right成分（X使用手表的privilege）。还谈到M获得手表的privilege，但这是获得财产的权利，不属于通常意义上的财产权，而属于经济自由，或者“追求幸福”的自由。M获得这块手表的liberty right（privilege）原本不存在，被X的power修订之后才产生。从权利之起源的角度来考虑，假如没有社会契约，M原本有更大的liberty right——抢夺或偷窃原属于X的手表——但社会契约之下这些伦理上的“假自由”（逻辑上仍然是真自由）必须被让渡，所以正常情况下M对这块手表没有liberty right，除非依赖X的power。
: 引文六（p.76-77）“Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the Owner of Whiteacre... as regards Blackacre, A has besides his rights, or claims, against B. C. D. E, and others, various legal privileges of controlling and using the land, and that these exist "to, over, or against" the land.”
: Hohfeld著作的第二部分论述了相对于少数个体的权利（right in personam，或paucital right，比如两个人之间的契约所决定的权利）和相对于庞大群体的权利（right in rem，或multital right，比如财产占有权，任何他人不得侵犯），在这个上下文中仍然涉及物主控制和使用财产的liberty right（privilege）。
: 引文七（p.92-94）：“"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally as a right good against all the world, actual instances of such ownership are often much more narrowly limited..." instead of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person. Repeating a hypothetical case put above, let us suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre... B, C, D, and others indefinitely... respectively considered, shall not enter on Blackacre. It is not a case of one joint duty of the same content resting on all... Consistently with this view, A might, e.g., extinguish B's duty or, in other words, grant B the privilege of entering by giving "leave and license" to do so. In such event, of course, the respective duties of C, D, E, and all others would continue to exist, precisely as before.”
: 上面这段话的目的是进一步解析“相对于庞大群体的权利”（right in rem，或multital right）的精微含义，但也涉及财产权的例子：A给予B进入A的土地的liberty right（privilege）。这里的“grant”就是二级权利power，修改了原先的一级权利（假如没有任何契约也就没有财产占有权，B随便去哪里都可以，包括Blackacre；在社会契约和产权契约之下B失去了进入A的土地Blackacre的自由；现在A又运用自己作为物主的power把这个自由重新赋予B）。
: 引文八（p.96-97）“A multital right, or claim (right in rem), should not be confused with any co-existing privileges or other jural relations that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect to the same subject-matter... A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, using
: the land, harming the land, etc., that is, within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases ; and correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other persons... In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, multital, or in rem, "right — duty" relations, multital, or in rem, "privilege — no-right" relations, multital, or in rem, "power — liability" relations, and multital, or in rem, "immunity — disability" relations... A's privileges, e.g., are strikingly independent of his rights or claims against any given person, and either might exist without the other.”
: 基本上是在重复早先的东西，但明确列出了财产权的两个一级权利（包括privilege）和两个二级权利。全书总共114页，俺看到最后也没有找出哪一处否定了财产权具有liberty right成分；相反，Hohfeld逻辑性极强，全书前后自洽。
: 关于当代学者的论点，俺是业余票友，难以查阅社科文献，所以只好借助网络和图书馆。Peter Jones能否算作有影响力的学者？他1994年出版的Rights一书详细讨论了Hohfeld体系（开篇第一章就是这个话题，俺只看了这一章），俺在网上读过的一些资料也引用或转述了Jones的观点。下面是Jones在Rights书中的原话，和Hohfeld原著以及俺昨天提供的斯坦佛大学网站上的说法是完全一致的：“if I have a property right in a car, that right is likely to consist of a complicated cluster of Hohfeldian rights. Typically these would include the claim-right that others should refrain from damaging my car or using it without my permission, my liberty-right as owner of the car to use the car, the power to sell the car or to permit others to use it, and my immunity from any power of others to dispose of the car without my consent. In other words, a single assertion of right might, on inspection, turn out to be a cluster of different types of right.” 当然，您可以说Jones没有真正理解Hohfeld。俺没有找到专门论证财产权不具有liberty right成分的文章，可以说俺在网上看过的所有的涉及财产权的资料都或者像Jones一样明确说明财物使用权是liberty right，或者没有涉及这个细节。
: 总而言之，财产权作为复合权利具有liberty right的成分，是Hohfeld的原始观点；您说后来有人把财产权的使用权成分也当作claim right，这种新理论推翻了Hohfeld体系的重要论点，而不是顺延发挥、在Hohfeld理论框架内阐述Hohfeld没有涉足的领域。Hohfeld英年早逝，咱们无法猜测他是否会接受这种新理论，但俺认为Hohfeld理论是正确的，那种新理论不是“修正”而是歪曲。谁能提供否定财产权具有liberty right成分的学术论文？俺很想看看这种新理论是怎样推导出来的。
: 【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: : 法学界误以为property rights包括liberty rights也不乏其人，这不希奇，因为Hohfeld的原文是先讨论各个概念的opposition（我有做某件事的liberty right /privilege /permission，意味着我没有不做这件事的duty），过了几节后才讨论各个概念的correlation（我有做某件事的liberty right /privilege /permission，意味着别人
: : 关于property rights在Hohfeld的框架下究竟应当如何理
: : (以下引言省略...)