(3)
(a) Thomas Streater, A Road Map to China’s Future from Japan’s Past; Mizuho’s Kengo Yoshida studies Japan’s history for lessons on China’s property, bank and leisure stocks. Barron's, Apr 24, 2015.
online.barrons.com/articles/a-road-map-to-chinas-future-from-japans-past-1429844646
Note:
(i) Kengo YOSHIDA 吉田 劍悟
(ii) "Just before the bubble burst, Japan’s total loans [debts] to GDP peaked at around 220%."
(iii) “In 1985, after the Plaza Accord, the yen appreciated and exporters had trouble and the economy went bad. So the government decided to lower interest rates.”
(A) Five nations (France, West Germany, Japan, UK and US) signed Plaza Accord on Sept 22, 1985 at Plaza Hotel in Manhattan. Wikipedia
(B) For the economic data, see next, which, however, did not contain Japan’s GDP growth rates in pertinent years.
Google compiles World Bank’s GDP growth rates for Korea, Japan and US--from 1961 to 2013 (inclusive)
www.google.com/publicdata/explor ... amp;hl=en&dl=en
, which shows Japan's GDP growth rates for 1985, 1986 and 1987 were 6.33, 2.83 and 4.11%, respectively (US in 1986 was just slightly better, at 3.5%).
(b) Box 1.4 Did the Plaza Accord Cause Japan's Lost Decades?
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/c1/box1_4.pdf
Quote:
“it [Plaza Accord] triggered an exceptionally large appreciation of the yen, amounting to 46 percent against the dollar and 30 percent in real effective terms by the end of 1986. (The deutsche mark appreciated similarly.) As a result, Japan’s export and GDP growth essentially halted in the first half of 1986.
"The [Japanese] authorities worried that higher interest rates would further strengthen the yen [higher interest rates would attract hot money from abroad coming into Japan, which inevitably cause yen appreciation (because, to park there, hot money has to been converted into local currency)] and feared that appreciation would eventually have serious effects on the economy. In the end, external demand [for Japanese goods] did indeed diminish. But it did not collapse. Real exports continued to grow in the five years after Plaza, by an average of 2½ percent a year (half the rate of the previous five years), while the current account surplus diminished by a moderate 2 percentage points of GDP. (Similarly, Germany’s currency appreciation failed to derail its export or GDP expansion, even with a smaller monetary response.)
Note:
(i) Box 1.4 appeared in
World Economic Outlook(WEO): Tensions from the Two-Speed Recovery; Unemployment, commodities, and capital flows. IMF, April 2011 (released Apr 11, 2011).
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/
(ii) "Japan was one of the world’s fastest-growing economies for three decades but has averaged only 1.1 percent real GDP growth since 1990, while prices have steadily declined. Consequently, the size of Japan’s economy [NOMINAL GDP] today is about the same as in the early 1990s."
(A) The "real" GDP growth rate subtract inflation (usually). See generally real versus nominal value (economics)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Real_versus_nominal_value_(economics)
(B) Figure 1.4.1 in Box 1.4 displayed Japan’s nominal GDP (1970-2009).
(C) Real GDP in Japan (DISCONTINUED); 2011: 4,383,325 Millions of 2011 US Dollars; Annual, Not Seasonally Adjusted, JPNRGDPR, Updated: 2012-12-10 10:32 AM CST. FRED, Dec 10, 2012.
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/JPNRGDPR
(D) In other words, Japan’s economy has been growing since 1990 at the rate of 1.1% on average (this is what real GDP means). However, in terms of (when measured with) JAPANESE YEN, Japan’s GDP now is about the same as that of 1990.
(iii) Basically (3)(a) and (b) are in accord. But (3)(b)--the IMF analysis--is scholarly, explaining that Japan’s government overreacted SEVERAL times in the wake of yen shock (Japanese: en-daka 円高) following the Plaza Accord.
(A) Japan tried monetary policy (by changing interest rates). See Japanese Recession
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_Recession
(after Plaza Accord: "The [Japanese] government attempted to offset the stronger yen by drastically easing monetary policy between January 1986 and February 1987. During this period, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) cut the discount rate in half from 5 percent to 2.5 percent. Following the economic stimulus, asset prices in the real estate and stock markets inflated, creating one of the biggest financial bubbles in history. The government responded by tightening monetary policy, raising rates five times, to 6 percent in 1989 and 1990. After these increases, the market collapsed")
Read this quotation while consulting the Figure 1.4.1 (left lower panel, whose heading was "Interest Rate Policy 1984-92")--in Box 1.4 of IMF.
(B) Japan also tried fiscal policy (cut tax and/or increase government spending through budget deficit). See Clyde Haberman, Japan Pushes Stimulus Plan, New York Times, May 30, 1987
www.nytimes.com/1987/05/30/busin ... -stimulus-plan.html
(Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone['s fiscal] $43 billion package contains $23.2 billion in spending on national and local public works program, $7.1 billion in tax cuts, $5 billion to provide lower-rate housing loans, $1 billion in direct Government purchases of foreign goods [the last to trim Japan's trade surplus, which was $89.7 billion] * * * But perhaps the program's greatest significance is its indication that the Government has finally broken from the fiscal austerity that Mr Nakasone has preached since taking office in 1982. * * * It [package] would be an addition to the regular budget of $386 billion for the 1987 fiscal year that began April 1. * * * The package was considerably larger than had been anticipated") |
发表于 4-25-2015 11:59:47
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