俄媒：中国建第三艘航母

choi

刘新宇, 俄媒：中国建第三艘航母 沿用前苏联战法. RFA, Feb 13, 2017.
www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao ... 02132017102136.html

Quote:

(a) "俄罗斯塔斯社2月13日报道，就在外界关注中国的第二艘航母 '山东舰' 即将在今年下水之际，北京方面已经开始了第三艘航母的建造。据塔斯社驻香港记者亚历山大·久金报道，第三艘航母将会是常规动力和 [三套] 蒸汽弹射。

(b) "据透露，如果说辽宁舰的排水量大约是55000吨，第二艘大约是7万吨，那么现在开建的第三艘航母排水量将大约是85000吨，并可能在2021年下水。其后才可能会考虑建造超过10万吨级的核动力超级航母。

(c) "对于中国建造的001A和002级航母的用途，有俄罗斯专家评论说，根据已经掌握的情报，中方的航母将会沿用前苏联的航母战略：主要为战略核潜艇护航。为此，常规动力航母已经足够。

"前苏联航母的主要任务并不同于西方航母的远海地区投射攻击力量。而是在为了保护战略核潜艇巡逻地区建立的所谓防密森严的 '堡垒' 系统中充当重要环节。其舰载机将驱离敌反潜直升机和反潜机，苏联航母上的重型反舰导弹也可打击反潜舰，使核潜艇在 '堡垒' 区域内能感到相对安全，保证战略核反击的能力。

Note:
(a) Presumably the Tass report is written in Russian, for I can not find an English-language report from Tass on this topic.

(b) The en.wikipedia.org has two pages titled "strategic nuclear weapon" and "tactical nuclear weapon," which are not helpful. Here is a good one.

Mark Stout, The Tactical versus Strategic Distinction: It’s A Big Deal, Right?  Air University's The Wright Stuff, May 13, 2010
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss ... gic_distinction.pdf

Quote:

* "So first, let's attempt to define exactly what a 'strategic' nuclear weapon is, which itself has been the subject of considerable debate. Yield, target, effect, and more have all been considered in the definition, but from a practical point of view, a strategic nuclear weapon is…well, it's one that's delivered
strategically. That means delivered via ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers.

"Tactical nuclear weapons, it follows, are those that are delivered using battlefield-type delivery systems over battlefield-type distances. However, since the size of a battlefield can vary greatly all we can really say is that they are not strategically-delivered. In locations such as Western Europe and the former Soviet satellite-states, the strategic-tactical issue might be considered a distinction without much of a difference.

* Non-strategic nuclear weapons are important to Russia because their nuclear doctrine values these weapons in the extreme: that‟s just what happens when your conventional forces cannot compete with many of your neighbors (Georgia excluded [which Russia successfully invaded in 2008]), let alone the US. Similarly, with a gross domestic product trailing the US, China, Japan, India, Germany, and the United Kingdom and a population rapidly trending downward, the only way Russia can be considered a superpower is through the prism of nuclear weapons. Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons give it an asymmetric advantage with regard to China, NATO, and the US, just as they surely will for Iran if or when Iran should come to acquire the bomb.

(i) Mark Stout is a program director on "Master's 硕士 in Global Securities Studies" and senior lecturer at Johns Hopkins University.
(ii) The Diplomat
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Diplomat
(online news magazine; Founded 2001 in Australia; acquired in 2007 and headquarters moved to Tokyo)
(iii) Air University (United States Air Force)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_University_(United_States_Air_Force)
(is headquartered at Maxwell Air Force Base [in Montgomery, capital of], Alabama; The Wright Brothers established the first US civilian flying school in Montgomery, Alabama in 1910)

Section 7 External links carries an item "The Wright Stuff" whose link is a dud -- not working.
(iv) The Wright Stuff.
https://twitter.com/au_wrightstuff
("Air University's bi-monthly electronic journal covering Department of Defense and national security issues")

(c)
(i) The 堡垒 in quotation (c) is "fortress" in English.
(ii) James R Holmes, Anti-Access and the 'Fortress-Fleet;' Why regional powers need not run a naval arms race with the United States. The Diplomat, September 2012
http://thediplomat.com/2012/09/a ... the-fortress-fleet/

two consecutive paragraphs:

"One of [Horatio] Nelson's biographers, Alfred Thayer Mahan, decried what he called the 'fortress–fleet,' the fleet that sheltered under the fort’s big guns for protection. This practice limited a navy’s freedom of maneuver to tiny sea areas. Worse, it neutered commanders, rendering them timid and defensive-minded. The Russian Navy sunkbyJapan in 1904-1905 was the fortress fleet par excellence.

But like Nelson, Mahan could never have foreseen today's long-range precision-guided weaponry. If Fortress China or Fortress Iran could use inexpensive shore-based weapons to clear adversaries from a massive offshore zone, think about what that would mean for its navy. Simple. It would render Mahan's critique moot. It would mean abundant liberty of action. No more playing defense underneath that protective shield.