Submarines: The Cursed Canadian Boats

choi

Strategy Page, Feb 14, 2014.
strategypage.com/htmw/htsub/articles/20140214.aspx
("Sixteen years after purchasing four slightly-used British diesel-electric submarines Canada still has not gotten all of them in shape to go to war. Currently, only one of the four Victoria class subs can go to sea actually fire a torpedo")

Note:
(a) HMCS Chicoutimi (SSK-879)
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMCS_Chicoutimi_(SSK_879)
(the following two acts by UK when the submarine was named HMS Upholder: Commissioned: 1990, decommissioned 1994; Canada: Commissioned: Oct 2004)

is named for Chicoutimi, Quebec.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicoutimi
(b) HMCS = Her Majesty's Canadian Ship
(c) There are four submaines in this class (called Upholder class in UK because Upholder was the lead ship, the first to build; called Victoria class by Canada, which renamed Unseen, the second submarine of this class, to Victoria). UK sold Canada all four submarines of this class in 1998 when UK decided to go all nuclear on submarines. Canada named these diesel electric submarines after Canadian port cities.

(d) Murray Brewster, Sub HMCS Chicoutimi, Repaired After 2004 Fire, Is Rejoining Canada’s Fleet. The Globe and Mail, Jan 6, 2014
www.theglobeandmail.com/news/nat ... et/article16212647/

Quote:

"The poor condition of the mothballed submarines – they were rusty, prone to flooding and one had a dented hull – tarnished the reputation of the boats.

"A subsequent military board of inquiry found that an open hatch allowed sea water from a rogue wave to wash down the conning tower and inundate poorly insulated high-voltage wires, triggering the fire.

"The initial estimate to repair the boat was pegged at $15-million in 2005. It quickly increased to $20-million in 2006, but internal documents suggest the price tag could run to more than $125-million, including removal of all fire-damaged components.

"HMCS Victoria is the Canadian navy’s only fully operational submarine, having completed the test firing of a live torpedo.

* There is no need to read the rest of this Globe & Mail report.


(e) HMCS Chicoutimi --Fires and Casualities: Final Report, Boards of Inquiry, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Dec 17, 2004.
www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/boi-ce/rp/hmcs-ncsm/rp/index-eng.aspx

Quote:

"In the forenoon of 5 October 2004, HMCS Chicoutimi was westward bound for Halifax and located 110 nautical miles northwest of Sligo, Ireland.  A significant ingress of water into the submarine that morning resulted in a chain of events with outcomes that could not have been predicted, and tragic consequences for which no one can be held responsible: a serious fire in the CO’s [Commanding Officer's] Cabin and Electrical Space, a fire in an oxygen generator, nine casualties, and the untimely death of Lieutenant(N) Chris Saunders." Executive Summary, paragraph 1

"Human factors played a key role in the water ingress.  The submarine was running opened up in marginal conditions such that both conning tower lids were open at the same time while repairs were being made to the upper lid vent.  However a wave much higher than the four-meter sea state welled-up in the fin and overflowed the tower.  There is neither evidence nor inference that anyone could have or should have predicted that water ingress would result in a serious fire two hours later." Executive Summary, paragraph 2

"Summary of the Events[:] At approximately 1030 on the morning of 5 October 2004 the lookout coming off watch on the bridge of HMCS Chicoutimi discovered a loose brass nut on the upper lid vent in the conning tower as he [lookout] came below. * * * Given the intention to dive the submarine within a few hours, repairing the upper lid vent was very important.  A repair party consisting of two Marine Engineering Technicians gathered their tools and assembled in the Control Room.  In order to repair the vent the upper lid would have to be left opened.  Two options presented themselves at this point, either leave both lids open and run the submarine opened up or shut the technicians out of the submarine by shutting the lower lid while they affected repairs to the vent.  After considering all of the factors involved, the Commanding Officer ordered the main engines shutdown, therefore propelling the submarine via the main batteries, and ordered the tower to be opened up at 1052. After working on the vent for approximately 25 minutes, one of the repair party proceeded below to get another tool.  Just as he was transiting through the conning tower, a wave hit the submarine causing water to well-up in the fin over the level of the conning tower upper lid, resulting in a significant ingress of water into the submarine.  The exact amount of water is unknown; however, based on testimony received it is believed to have been approximately 2,000 litres.  11. In this particular case, the catch basin at the base of the tower was insufficient in size to contain the water and it overflowed into the Control Room.