Major General Joel Vowell of US Army Japan, on Taiwan

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(1) 方德豪 and 程文, 美軍官：倘台海衝突將較二戰更慘烈　美法元首通電申台海和平重要. Radio Free Asia,
https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/news/jp-war-04212023061009.html

Note:
(a) The news report is written in traditional Chinese, as it is published in 粤语 section.
(b) Despite "綜合外電報道" in the report, there is no news report anywhere in the Web, be it Google News or elsewhere. However, US Department of State does offer the transcript and audio recording for the online press conference that it (Department) hosts.
(c) It is rare for an American military officer to talk about war effort ofr diplomavym and it even rarer that the talk is hosted by US government.

(2) Digital Press Briefing with Major General Joel Vowell, Commanding General, US Army Japan. US Department of State, Apr 20, 2023 (under the heading "SPECIAL BRIEFING.
https://www.state.gov/digital-pr ... ral-u-s-army-japan/

Quote:

(a) MAJOR GENERAL VOWELL:  "And so our goal in US Army Japan and my headquarters and Indo-Pacific Command, number one, no war.  Any conflict in this region is going to be horrific.  As we watch Ukraine and Russia on the second invasion from Russia into Ukraine now over its year, since February 22, [2022,] it's horrific in scale, the loss of life and infrastructure and the uprooting of civil society that's being – that's happening.  One could only project what that might mean if there were a larger conflagration or conflict here in the first island chain in the Indo-Pacific.  It would be – it would be catastrophic economically across the world and also just in a personal human cost, something that would exceed or at least equal those of World War II, where thousands of soldiers across different formations were lost in a week, something that we’re not prepared to do or not want to do.  No one wants that.

"So going back to deterrence, no war, trying to prevent that from happening.  But at the same time my formation and my joint brothers and sisters are charged with being ready and providing options for national leadership and senior leadership in our services for those options should crisis portend into conflict.

"So this is the most challenging time I have seen in my 32 years of active duty.  And I'm ]sic; should be 'I was,' referring to his childhood and teen years] an Army dependent who grew up with a father in the service and we lived in West Germany, a country that doesn’t exist anymore.  But we were there to stop the Soviet invasion of NATO and expansion into Western Europe.  That was going to be a horrific conflict in the ‘70s of ‘80s if that ever happened.  Thank goodness it didn't.  But even with that in mind, as a young dependent child living overseas, I haven't seen the security framework so distressed and in disarray and challenged as it is right now in '23 across the globe.  We see that heat and light here in the Indo-Pacific, and it's a challenge each day to make sure that we have the right formations, the right posture, and the right dialogue with our allies and partners to be ready together.  Again, absent a NATO-like organization, we do a lot bilaterally with the countries in the region.

"So the last thing I'll leave you with is all of my time as a general officer the last five years has been out here forward in the Indo-Pacific.  So in that five years, we and I personally have seen some dramatic changes.  One, the People’s Republic of China has just belied what they want to do and some of the statements they’ve made publicly in some fora like the Shangri-La Dialogue, where the foreign minister says Asia is not for Asians, it’s for China – the future is China and the region.  And that’s okay as long as it’s agreed upon, but a lot of countries don’t want that and the bellicose statements that come forward.

"Two, the COVID response – when the PRC was telling countries to recognize them, not Taiwan, and then we’ll give you COVID vaccines to help save your people – was seen with an upturned eye with a lot of countries in the region and the globe, that the coercive diplomacy is seen for what it is.

"And lastly in the region, the Ukraine-Russia conflict, the second invasion of Ukraine as I mentioned earlier, has caused a lot of the folks and leaders in the region to take stock and take notice.  And I see that particularly here in Japan and I see that in the first island chain itself.  And when I talk to my Japanese counterparts about lessons learned that transfer or are transferrable to this region from the security environment, they use the geographic model that’s happening in Eastern Europe right now.  And I’ll go back to the map and point to it.  The Japanese who I work with each day consider Japan is like Poland; the Philippines is like Romania; China is like Russia; Taiwan is Ukraine.  That’s a useful tool to try to understand the security environment in Europe and where it could be a challenge similar to here in the Indo-Pacific in the first island chain.  I would argue that’s not exactly the national models; they don’t comport exactly like that.  But that’s where Japan sees their role to help prevent a conflict and defend their country by having more capabilities and more ties with likeminded partners and allies like the United States invested in exercises, invested in capabilities forward to increase that deterrence framework and help them deter in this environment.

"So I'll pause there and open up to questions.

(b) Q&A  "MODERATOR:  Thank you, sir.  We will now turn to the question-and-answer portion of today's briefing.  Our first question was submitted in advance.  It goes to Christopher Woody of Insider in Washington, D.C.  “How have the roles and planning of Japan’s army and of U.S. Army Japan evolved as the Japanese military has shifted its focus to the defense of the country’s southwest, which is largely an air and maritime theater?”

"MAJOR GENERAL VOWELL:  That is very – that's a great question, very germane to now, and going back to what I said from five years ago.  The defense of Japan was primarily focused on aggression from North Korea – potential crises or conflicts with North Korea, and how Japan and their sovereignty could be impacted by that.  That was five years ago.

"Now its focused on the southwest islands, because the greater threat to Japan’s sovereignty is the People’s Republic of China, particularly the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the – that’s doing drills in the East China Sea and distant sea operations east of Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands.

"So southwest islands on this map, if I may – here, Yonaguni, closest to Taiwan.  About a hundred kilometers from Taipei, so about 65 miles from Taipei.  You have Miyako, Ichikawa, Okinawa, Amami Island – sovereign Japanese territories that have been.  And there’s some key terrain discussions that Japan is worried about that – and any military operation that China has said that they would reserve the right to use military force to intervene in Taiwan, that the People's Liberation Army would have to at least block if not outright seize some of those islands to isolate Taiwan from an intervention by Western forces, if that's the US, Japan, or whomever.  It's just key terrain.

So Japan looks at that and they see the threat from Chinese coast guard militias that have pushed out Japanese fishermen around the islands.  They've seen all of these naval and air activities that have happened in and around Japanese exclusive economic zones.  And just recently, when Speaker Pelosi visited Taiwan, the PRC launched eight missiles over Taiwan.  Several of those, we believe, deliberately landed in the exclusive economic zone of Japan, in the waters off these islands as a strategic message.

"And so all that to say, the focus has shifted to the real problem today and tomorrow, which is protecting the sovereignty of Japan, main effort in the southwest islands.  We see that together very clearly, very soberly, as the greatest security challenge.  We have a large number of Joint Forces in Okinawa, and so the discussions we've been working on is how to help Japan better posture the defense of the southwest islands, and we do that in several ways.

(c) "QUESTION: * * * And then sort of related to this, just a look at potential sort of challenges in this military buildup.  One of those is the logistics side, often overlooked but very important for any military operation.  Japan doesn't really have much lift capability for its SDF [Self Defense Force], at least not enough that it would need – if there was a contingency in Taiwan, and the need to rely on merchant ships, which historically is difficult as well because of legacies from the Second World War?  [The answer is as expected -- US does have (lift capability).]

Note:
(a) The title of this briefing said, "Major General Joel Vowell, Commanding General, US Army Japan." That is, he is head of "US Army Japan."

United States Indo-Pacific Command
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Indo-Pacific_Command
(1947- ; "It is the oldest and largest of the unified combatant commands [for this, see section 5 History]. * * * The Indo-Pacific Command consists of the component commands US Army Pacific, US Marine Forces Pacific, US Pacific Fleet, US Pacific Air Forces")

Section 3 Force structure shows a huge table, top of which is US Army Pacific (headquartered in Hawaii). And "United States Army Japan" is merely one of a myriad of sib-sub commands.

(b) "Now its focused on the southwest islands"

Ryukyu Islands
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ryukyu_Islands
("(琉球諸島, Ryūkyū-shotō), also known as the Nansei Islands (南西諸島, Nansei-shotō, lit. 'Southwest Islands') or the Ryukyu Arc (琉球弧, Ryūkyū-ko)" )