Pentagon’s 2015 Report on China’s Military

choi

Annual Report to Congress; Military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China 2015. US Department of Defense, Apr 8, 2015 (RefID: D-117FA69).
www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf

Quote:

‘"In 2014, China started reclaiming land and building enhanced infrastructure at its outposts in the Spratly Islands."  page 4

"The third and fourth J-20 stealth fighter prototypes conducted first flights in March and July 2014, respectively, and test flights with a fifth prototype may occur by the end of 2015. Within two years of the J-20 stealth fighter’s first flight in January 2011, China tested a second next generation fighter prototype. The prototype, referred to as the “J-31,” is similar in size to a US F-35 fighter and appears to incorporate design characteristics similar to the J-20. It conducted its first flight on October 31, 2012. At present, it is unclear if the J-31 is being developed for employment by the PLA, or as an export platform to compete with the US F-35 on the arms market."  page 12

"Noteworthy 2014 accomplishments for China’s space program include: First Sub-meter Resolution Imager: Following its launch in August, the Gaofen-2 became China’s first satellite capable of sub-meter resolution imaging. China reportedly plans to use the satellite for a variety of purposes, including the sale of commercial imagery."  page 13

"On May 13, 2013, China launched an object into space on a ballistic trajectory with a peak altitude above 30,000 km. This trajectory took it near geosynchronous orbit, where many nations maintain communications and earth-sensing satellites. Analysis of the launch determined that the booster was not on the appropriate trajectory to place objects in orbit and that no new satellites were released. The post-boost vehicle continued its ballistic trajectory and re-entered Earth orbit 9.5 hours after launch. The launch profile was not consistent with traditional space-launch vehicles, ballistic missiles or sounding rocket launches used for scientific research. It could, however, have been a test of technologies with a counterspace mission in geosynchronous orbit. The United States and several public organizations expressed concern to Chinese representatives and asked for more information about the purpose and nature of the launch. China thus far has refrained from providing additional information." page 14 (Page 35 repeats the same theme, betraying Pentagon's obsession)

"Nuclear Weapons. * * * Land-Based Platforms: China’s nuclear arsenal currently consists of 50-60 ICBMs [no increase] * * * [ii] Sea-based Platforms: China continues to produce the JIN-class SSBN, with four commissioned and another under construction. The JIN will eventually carry the CSS-NX-14 (JL-2) SLBM with an estimated range of 7,400 km [my recollection is the 2014 report said deployment of JL-2 was imminent, within months. This year's assessment seems to be a retreat]." page 32

choi

"China boasts the most dynamic space program in the world today, supported by a robust capacity for space-lift."  page 69

"SPECIAL TOPIC: CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF MISSILE DEFENSE[:] China is developing its own missile defense capability, going beyond the long-range SAMs that it has acquired from foreign suppliers that provide only a limited capability against ballistic missiles. China continues to develop a missile defense umbrella consisting of a kinetic energy intercept capability at exo-atmospheric altitudes, as well as intercepts of ballistic missiles and other aerospace vehicles within the upper atmosphere. China has tested a ground-based, midcourse interceptor, with the first test occurring in January 2010. Shortly after the test, China claimed that the test was defensive in nature and not directed at any country. China’s next test of the ground-based interceptor came in January 2013. It too, was successful, prompting a Second Artillery Force Engineering Institute professor to claim that 'the success of this missile defense test means that China has already successfully resolved the issues of upper atmosphere target identification, tracking, and terminal guidance issues and that it s mid-course missile defense technology is at the forefront of world technology.' Meanwhile, other Chinese commentators have noted that China remains far behind the United States, with a number of issues still needing to be addressed. These include resisting electronic attack and the capacity to respond to multiple warheads. Finally, if China is to deploy an effective BMD [ballistic missile defense] system, it will need to be supported by a space-based early warning system, currently missing from China’s BMD infrastructure."  page 71

My comment:
(a) Mr Ashton Carter was sworn in as secretary of defense on Feb 17, 2015. Perhaps because of this, the annual report this year is substantially re-written, compared with the 2014 version.
(b) There is no need to read the rest of the report.

choi

“Long-Range Precision Strike: The development of China’s conventionally armed missile capability has been extraordinarily rapid. As recently as ten years ago, several hundred short range ballistic missiles could range targets in Taiwan, but China had only a rudimentary capability to strike many other locations within or beyond the first island chain, such as US bases in Okinawa or Guam. Today, however, China is fielding an array of conventionally armed ballistic missiles (China currently has at least 1,200), as well as ground- and air-launched LACMs [Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: air-and ground-launched], SOF [Special Operations Force], and cyber warfare capabilities to hold targets at risk throughout the region. US bases in Japan are in range of a growing number of Chinese MRBMs [Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km)] as well as a variety of LACMs. Guam could also possibly be targeted by air-launched LACMs." pages 33-34

"The majority of China’s missile programs, including its ballistic and cruise missile systems, are comparable to other international top-tier producers, while its surface-to-air missile systems lag behind global leaders [what about China's ground-based anti-satellite missiles?]."  page 51

Chapter "5 Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency * * * Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and difficult military operations. Success depends upon air and sea superiority, rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore, and uninterrupted support. An attempt to invade Taiwan would strain China’s armed forces and invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with China’s combat force attrition and the complexity of urban warfare and counterinsurgency (assuming a successful landing and breakout), make amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. Taiwan’s investments to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could also decrease China’s ability to achieve its objectives. Moreover, China does not appear to be building the conventional amphibious lift required to support such a campaign."  page 59

"TAIWAN’S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES [section heading within Chapter 5]  Taiwan has historically relied upon multiple military variables to deter PLA aggression: the PLA’s inability to project sufficient power across the Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan military’s technological superiority, and the inherent geographic advantages of island defense. China’s increasingly modern weapons and platforms (more than 1,200 conventional ballistic missiles, an ASBM program, ships and submarines, combat aircraft, and improved C4ISR capabilities) have eroded or negated many of these factors."  page 61