北京逐渐摆脱了对俄国军火与燃料的依赖

choi

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中俄交往中北京开始占据上风. BBC Chinese, Oct 3, 2011
http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2011/10/111003_china_russia.shtml

Note: Prominently displayed in the home page of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
http://www.sipri.org/
is
Chinese-Russian Security and Energy Relations Are Crumbling. Oct 3, 2011

, which heralds the new book:
  
Linda Jakobson, Paul Holtom, Dean Knox and Jingchao Peng, China's Energy and Security Relations With Russia; Hopes, frustrations and uncertainties. SIPRI, Oct 2011 (policy paper 29)http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP29.pdf

Quote from the book:

"One of the most important and unique aspects of this study is its emphasis on Chinese perspectives." preface

"Relations between China and Russia are regularly described as ‘at their best in
history’ by officials from both sides. Yet Chinese foreign policy specialists stress
that centuries of antagonism have bred a deep-rooted mistrust that continues to
challenge the fostering of close China–Russia relations." summary

"A Chinese foreign policy specialist stated that although many Chinese dislike Japan
or the United States , they concede they have much to learn from these two countries.
He concluded, ‘But what do the Chinese have to learn from Russia?’[footnote 8]  Chinese
analysts often observe that China has risen to great power status as Russia’s power has waned. China has surpassed Russia as a focus of attention among policymakers in Washington, further complicating China–Russia relations. In addition, China has used its economic power to gain political clout in Central Asian countries, which Russia perceives as part of its traditional sphere of influence." page 2

"A fundamental problem in the relationship is divergence between Chinese and Russian world views. Chinese analysts believe that Russia views itself predominantly in European terms, a heritage which is alien to China. Chinese people are aware that Russians have historically seen China as inferior and that Russians find it demeaning to be slipping into the junior role of resource provider. Moreover, Chinese analysts tend to assume that Russia wishes to be part of Europe and that Russia therefore ‘cannot antagonize the West’, thereby weakening its desire or ability to strengthen the strategic partnership with China. However, these views fail to take into account the debate within Russia regarding its own complex relationship with ‘Europe’ and the fact that Russian officials and scholars are re-evaluating Russia’s role in Asia. Russian officials and analysts increasingly emphasize the need for Russia to develop an ‘Asian vector’
and pay more attention to its eastern neighbours." pages 9-10

(Pages 10-12 are important. You need to read it yourself.)

"China’s first large orders for combat aircraft, air defence systems and naval equipment from Russia took place following a Taiwanese procurement drive that included purchases of combat aircraft and naval equipment from the USA and France in 1992. The reason that China turned to Russia to meet its perceived need for advanced combat aircraft, air defence systems and naval equipment is twofold. First, China’s own domestic arms industry was unable to meet the demands of the air force and navy to provide equipment comparable to that being acquired by Taiwan and other states in China’s neighbourhood. Second, China had a limited range of potential suppliers following the imposition of European Union (EU) and US arms embargoes in 1989." page 16

"Nevertheless, [despite progress of its own defense industry] China is likely to remain partially dependent on imports of a number of advanced weapon systems, components and technologies
for the coming decade, particularly long-range strike, tanker and transport aircraft,
and high-performance ship-launched land-attack missiles. In contrast to
the energy relationship (see chapter 4), China has been unable to substantially
diversify its arms and military technology suppliers. There are thus opportunities
for Russia to remain China’s primary foreign arms supplier, although there are
questions as to whether Russia is willing and able to meet China’s changing
demands for transfers of technology and components rather than finished
weapons systems. * * * Yet Chinese arms producers will continue to require foreign
assistance for components and technologies for combat aircraft, submarines
and large surface warships. Manufacturing engines is a continuing weakness for
China’s arms industry and represents an area where Russia or other willing
suppliers are likely to maintain a presence." pages 16-17

Russia "has fallen behind technologically and has begun to import arms and technologies from Israel and Western Europe for its own military modernization.85 Russia is therefore unable to meet certain Chinese technology demands. * * * National export control agencies of EU member states have interpreted the EU arms embargo flexibly, particularly with regard to dual-use products and technologies. For example, EU member states issued export licences worth more than