Americans Debate Military Strategy in Defending Taiwan

choi

Today's news first.

(1)
(a) 锺辰芳, 美学者激辩战略模糊 台海两岸学者要战略清晰、双重威慑. VOA Chinese, Oct 17, 2020
https://www.voachinese.com/a/us- ... 201016/5624772.html
("自从9月初在《外交事务》期刊上发表文章，呼吁 '美国应该采取战略清晰立场，清楚表明它将对任何中国对台使用武力的作为做出反应' 后，美国外交关系协会会长的李察·哈斯(Richard Hass)和共同作者研究员萨克斯(David Hass)就在美国学术界掀起一阵关于美国对台海应该战略模糊还是战略清晰的辩论")

Note:
(i) Richard Haass and David Sacks, American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous; To keep the peace, make clear to China that force won't stand. September 2020.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/a ... must-be-unambiguous
is behind a paywall, except paragraph 1.
(A) The quotation above in VOA misspells the last names of both authors.
(B) Haass is variant of more common German and Jeiwwish surname Haas, Modern German noun masculine Hase meaning "hare."
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Hase
(C) Richard N Haass
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_N._Haass (1951- ; president of the Council on Foreign Relations since 2003)

(b) Paul Wolfowitz, The Korean War's Lesson for Taiwan; Stalin nixed Kim Il-Sung's plan to invade the South until he was convinced the US wouldn't strike back. Wall Street Journal, Oct 14, 2020.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the ... -taiwan-11602628554
https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-korean-wars-lesson-for-taiwan/

My comment: I am always convinced that Taiwan alone can fight China.

choi

(2) 张永泰, 美国陆军刊物文章建议美军重返台湾 引发台朝野热议. VOA Chinese, Sept 23, 2020
https://www.voachinese.com/a/rea ... 200923/5594397.html
("最新一期美国陆军 '军事评论双月刊' (Military Review)以中国武力侵犯台湾为主题进行了一系列的报道，其中由美军海军陆战队上尉米尔斯(Walker D Mills)撰写的文章指出，台海区域权力平衡日益向北京倾斜，如果要维持捍卫台湾主权的承诺，美国应该重新考虑在台湾部署地面部队")

Note: The feature articles, including the cover, September-October 2020 issue of Military Review is about Taiwan vis-a-vis China. In the home page of Military Review (magazine), whose subtitle is "The Professional Journal of the US Army."
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Military-Review/
(a) The bottom half of the home page is divided with a solid line containing "QUICK LINKS," whose first item is "About Military Review (MR)":
Published by "The Army University Press," The Military Review provides an established and well-regarded Army forum to stimulate original thought and debate on topics related to the art and science of land warfare.
(n) In the center of the top half of the home page is the cover of this issue, underneath in neon blue is the link "Click here to read now."

Click the link and you reach the issue, whose first articles includes:


Capt Walker D Mills (US Marine Corps), Deterring the Dragon; Returning US forces to Taiwan.  A U.S. marine opines that if the United States wants to maintain credible conventional deterrence against a People’s Liberation Army attack on Taiwan, it needs to consider basing troops in Taiwan.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/ ... s-Deterring-Dragon/

Quote (footnotes omitted):

"this year, the commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. David Berger, announced that the corps would reprioritize operations in the Pacific. The US Army [based in S Korea also, like marines], despite having a Pacific presence similar in size to the Marine Corps, continues to prioritize deterrence in Europe, and even within US Indo-Pacific Command, it is focused on deterring North Korea rather than China.

"In Taiwan’s case, it is helpful to break deterrence down into two components: the perceived ability to prevent a PLA invasion (often called denial) and the perceived ability to effectively respond to one with force and fight a larger conflict. The distinction is important because it is now likely that the United States has little or no ability to prevent such an action [ie, to be incapable of denial]. Chinese missiles and missile-armed bombers could, with little or no warning, cripple the US aviation support infrastructure in East Asia and neutralize flat-deck Navy vessels [read: aircraft carriers] in the opening hours of a conflict. By targeting runways, China could prevent the United States from bringing other aircraft into theater, and China could use its considerable number of surface ships and submarines to prevent or delay the arrival of out-of-theater U.S. naval assets. The United States would still retain a long-range bomber force capable of striking PLA targets and probably submarine assets capable of striking targets on land and at sea. However, unsupported, these assets would be vulnerable to Chinese fighter aircraft and antisubmarine warfare efforts, respectively. A surprise PLA attack on US forces and Taiwan could effectively isolate Taiwan from US support and prevent U.S. interference in a cross-strait invasion for days, if not weeks. A RAND study found that with only 274 missiles (a small fraction of the PLA inventory), the PLA could keep Kadena Air Force Base [Kadena Air Base 嘉手納飛行場, located at 沖縄県中頭郡嘉手納町] in Okinawa close to fighter operations for thirty days and three times as long for tanker operations.41 This would be adequate time for the PLA to gain a foothold in Taiwan and expand its air defense umbrella across the strait. Similarly, a more limited PLA strategy of blockade or an extended air and missile campaign would effectively preclude US forces from defending Taiwan later.  The second component of deterrence, the ability to react, now becomes important.

"To effectively deter China and the PLA, America needs to posture its forces in a way that would inevitably trigger a larger conflict and make plain its commitment to Taiwanese defense. * * * Altering the Balance: Returning U.S. Forces to Taiwan [which is [sectional heading] It is time to consider returning US forces to Taiwan. [My recommendation is read this last section; the entire article is long.]