美台两组外交官1月11日接触 + 國安文件解密

choi

There is no need to read the rest of all below.

(1) 胡凱文 and 霍亮喬, 台灣駐荷代表到訪美國大使館[;] 趙立堅：PRC才是中國唯一合法政府. Radio Free Asia, Jan 12, 2021
https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/ne ... 01122021142316.html
("美國國務院上周六（9日）宣布解除所有美台接觸限制後的首個工作日，周一（11日），即有兩項美台官員的交流活動。其中，美國駐荷蘭大使胡克斯特拉（Pete Hoekstra）與台灣駐荷蘭代表陳欣新，在美國駐荷蘭大使館會面，「搶閘」成為解禁後首場美台官員的公開交流活動。  胡克斯特拉當日即在推特發布雙方會面時的照片 * * * 接著在華府，美國國務院政軍局助卿庫布（Assistant Secretary Cooper）於美東時間周一（11日）上午11時半左右，與台灣駐美代表蕭美琴舉行閉門會議。但相關會晤的地點沒有公開，雙方亦沒有發布照片。  據台灣傳媒報道，庫布在上周三（6日）出席與台灣外交部和國防部官員的政治及軍事對話，但內容同樣沒有對外公開。  這次並非庫布與蕭美琴的首次會面，蕭美琴在去年七月底赴美履新後，8月14日庫布曾在推特發布與蕭美琴擊肘的照片")

Note: R Clarke Cooper. Assistant Secretary [for] Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. May 2, 2019-present.
https://www.state.gov/biographies/r-clarke-cooper/

United States Department of States has thirty one (31) bureaus, including Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, with whose head (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) we are familiar.

choi

(2)
(a) 劉少風, 特朗普國安文件提前30年解密：不讓中國在第一島鏈有海空優勢. Radio Free Asia, Jan 13, 2021
https://www.rfa.org/cantonese/ne ... 01132021042324.html
("特朗普政府的印太戰略秘密細節及重點，包括不讓中國在第一島鏈有海空優勢，將台灣列第一島鏈夥伴，聯同澳、印、日等盟友對抗中國等。這份文件早了30年公開，學者分析，這種做法非比尋常，相信特朗普是為下屆政府帶來壓力，以免對中國政策方向有太大轉變")
(b) US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific. White House,  (declassified on) Jan 5, 2021.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-co ... S-Final-Declass.pdf

Quote (boldface, underlying and italics in original):

"NSC [National Security Council] declassification review  
Declassify in Part
by Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ['commonly referred to as the National Security Advisor (NSA)': Wikipedia]
Robert C O'Brien  1/5/2021

"National Security Challenges [which is sectional heading]: • How to maintain US strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region and promote a liberal order while preventing China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence * * *

"Assumptions [sectional heading]:
• Strategic competition between the United States and China will persist, owning to the divergent nature and goals of our political and economic systems. * * *
• China aims to dissolve US alliances and partnerships in the region.  * * *
• China will take increasingly assertive steps to compel unification with Taiwan. Russia will remain a marginal player in the Indo-Pacific region relative to the United States, China, and India.

"Desired End States [sectional heading]:
* * *
• The United States maintains diplomatic, economic, and military preeminence in the fastest growing region of the world; most nations in the Indo-Pacific view the United States as their preferred partner; US economic strength and influence increase throughout the region.
* * *
• Free markets are the mainstream of Asia * * *
• Regional disputes are resolved lawfully and without coercion.
India's preferred partner on security issues is the United States * * *
* * *
"Line of Efforts [sectional heading]:
Alliances & Partnerships
• Objectives: Emphasize our commitment to the region * * *
  * * *
• Objectives: Enable Taiwan to develop an effective asymmetric defense strategy and capabilities that will help ensure its security, freedom from coercion, resilience, and ability to engage China on its own terms.
  * * *
India and South Asia
• Objectives: Accelerate India' rise and capacity to serve as a net provider of security and Major Defense Partner * * *
   • Actions: * * * Offer support to India -- through diplomatic, military, and intelligence channels -- to help address continental challenges such as the border dispute with China and access to water, including the Brahmaputra [雅鲁藏布江] and other rivers facing diversion by China.
   • [blacked out] support India's 'Act Fast' policy and its aspiration to be a leading global power, highlighting its compatibility with the US, Japanese, and Australian version of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
   * * *
China
* * *
• Objectives: Promote US values throughout the region to maintain influence and counterbalance Chinese models of government.
   • Actions:
    * * *
   • Encourage South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, Japan, and other regional democratic partners to demonstrate their own successes and the benefits they have accrued.
    * * *
• Objectives: Deter China from using military force against the United States and US allies or partners, and develop the capabilities and concepts to defeat Chinese actions across the spectrum of conflicts.
   • Actions: Enhance combat-credible US military presence and posture in the Indo-Pacific region to uphold US interests and security commitments.
   • Devise and implement a defense strategy capable of, but not limited to: (1) denying China sustained air and sea dominance inside the 'first island chain' in s conflict; (2) defending the first-island-chain nations, including Taiwan; and (3) dominating all domains outside the first island-chain.  [blacked out]  
   • Help our allies and partnerships improve their security posture, including military capabilities and interoperability [between US and another nation], to ensure strategic independence and freedom from Chinese coercion. Expand partnerships and capabilities that limit China's ability to coerce allies and partners.
    * * *