麦肯锡咨询机构报告：中国债务增长惊人

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BBC Chinese, Feb 5, 2015.
www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/world/2015/02/150205_china_debts


(2) The original report:

Richard Dobbs, Susan Lund, Jonathan Woetzel, and Mina Mutafchieva, Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging. McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), February 2015.
www.mckinsey.com/insights/econom ... t_much_deleveraging

(a) In this summary page:

"Seven years after the bursting of a global credit bubble [in 2007] resulted in the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, debt continues to grow. In fact, rather than reducing indebtedness, or deleveraging, all major economies today have higher levels of borrowing relative to GDP than they did in 2007. Global debt in these years has grown by $57 trillion, or 17 percent of global GDP.

"China’s debt has quadrupled since 2007. Fueled by real estate and shadow banking, China’s total debt has nearly quadrupled, rising to $28 trillion by mid-2014, from $7 trillion in 2007. At 282 percent of GDP, China’s debt as a share of GDP, while manageable, is larger than that of the United States or Germany. Three developments are potentially worrisome: half of all loans are linked, directly or indirectly, to China’s overheated real-estate market; unregulated shadow banking accounts for nearly half of new lending; and the debt of many local governments is probably unsustainable. However, MGI calculates that China’s government has the capacity to bail out the financial sector should a property-related debt crisis develop. The challenge will be to contain future debt increases and reduce the risks of such a crisis, without putting the brakes on economic growth.

(b) The full report:
(i) does not mention Taiwan.
(ii) has China as the topic of one chapter, out of a total five (chapters).

the firt two paragraphs of chapter 4 "China’s debt: Three risks to watch Page":

"Until recently, China’s unprecedented economic rise was not accompanied by a significant expansion in leverage. From 2000 to 2007, total debt [4 components: government, financial institutions, non-financial corporate, and households] grew only slightly faster than GDP, reaching 158 percent of GDP, a level in line with that of other developing economies. Since then, debt has risen rapidly. By the middle of 2014, China’s total debt had reached 282 percent of GDP, far exceeding the developing economy average and higher than some advanced economies, including [South Korea (286%),] Australia [274%], the United States [269%], Germany  [258%], and Canada [247%] (Exhibit 33). The Chinese economy has added $20.8 trillion of new debt since 2007, which represents more than one-third of global growth in debt. The largest driver of this growth has been borrowing by non‑financial corporations, including property developers. At 125 percent of GDP, China now has one of the highest levels of corporate debt [3rd component of the total debt] in the world.

"Throughout history and across countries, rapid growth in debt has often been followed by financial crises.72 The question today is whether China will avoid this path and reduce credit growth in time, without unduly harming economic growth. While the size of China’s current debt burden remains manageable, we identify three areas of risk. First, roughly half of the debt of households, non‑financial corporations, and government is associated with real estate, either directly or indirectly. The second risk is rapid growth in lending to local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), many of which may struggle to repay. A 2014 audit of local governments found that more than 20 percent of recent loans were used to pay older debts and that almost 40 percent of debt servicing and repayments were funded by land sales. The third risk stems from the fact that around one-third of outstanding debt in
China is provided by its rapidly growing, opaque shadow banking system.

* A footnote is omitted in each quoted paragraph.