What Taiwan's Military Can Learn From the Armenia-Azerbaijan War

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Eric Chan, What Taiwan's Military Can Learn From the Armenia-Azerbaijan War. The Diplomat, Dec 9, 2020.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/ ... nia-azerbaijan-war/

Quote:

(a) "the first and most obvious lesson of the Armenia-Azerbaijan war is that through massed unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), it is possible for ground forces to cheaply replicate elements of a robust air force at a localized level.

"As demonstration of this, the Azerbaijanis used loitering munitions (kamikaze drones), medium-strike UAS with guided munitions, and recon UAS in concert with artillery, to devastating effect. Against an entrenched opponent, the strikes decimated the fixed command posts, logistics centers, and assembly areas, badly weakening Armenian defenses. Reinforcing heavy armor received the same treatment, only worse; caught out in the open, with predictable lines of advance, some 240 tanks were destroyed or captured. The destruction of Armenian armor and mechanized forces was crucial in allowing light Azerbaijani special operation forces with artillery support to capture the mountainous defensive point of Shusha, which effectively ended the war.

"In the case of a successful landing of the PLA on Taiwan, Taiwan would be on the strategic defensive. Given expected PLA Air Force air superiority, small radar-evading UAS may mean the difference between the Taiwan army being forced to remain in an operationally defensive role or having the ability to take the offensive during a period of high vulnerability for the PLA. The PLA, like the Armenians, would be fixed in place while desperately bringing up enough logistical capability to go on the offensive – which would then be on predictable lines of advance to Taipei. This would actually be a worse scenario than having the initial invasion armada destroyed at sea, because a partial but inadequate landing force would not be able to easily retreat, would continue to be a massive resource sink for the PLA, and would essentially be a marooned hostage if the U.S. Air Force and Navy destroyed resupply capability.

(b) "One of the greatest advantages the PLA holds over the Taiwan military is the ability to conduct precision missile saturation. * * * Previously, the Second Artillery (now PLA Rocket Force, PLARF) development of short range ballistic missiles was meant as a counter to the expected qualitative advantage of Taiwan’s Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) platforms and training * * *  However, in a demonstration of the rapid evolution and growth of PLA capabilities, the main focus of the PLARF is no longer on developing short-range missiles to counter Taiwan defense [presumably the targets were Taiwan runways], but instead developing medium- to long-range hypersonics to counter and deter US intervention.

(c) "In Taiwan's case, this lesson [of 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war] calls for a military able to consider multiple ways of war past the US model, which is expeditionary, air-centric, mobile – and backed up by a massive resource/manpower base. The US model addresses problems that Taiwan does not need to worry about, with a base that Taiwan does not have [meaning Taiwan force is not going to land of another country, and there is no  need to worry about logistics and food supply].

(d) "Azerbaijan used a mix of modern (but hardly cutting edge) and old systems in innovative ways, cleverly turning an assessed Armenian strength – fortified defenses – into a deadly weakness. More important than equipment is the thinking behind the use of the equipment.

(e) "Eric Chan is a specialist in Chinese/Korean political and security affairs, working as a China/Korea advisor for the US Air Force's Checkmate office. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not represent the views of his employer.

Note:
(a) In paragraph 3 of quotation (a), by "The PLA, like the Armenians, would be fixed in place" the author turns conventional wisdom on its head: In the initial phase of a successful landing by PLA to a beach in Taiwan, it will be PLA that will take defensive poistions, entrenched to wait for reinforcement from China. Therefore, it is the invasion force, not Taiwanese force, that will be akin to Armenia's.
(b) Jonathan Swan, US Losing Time to Deter China. Axios, Dec 4, 2020  
https://www.axios.com/stanley-mc ... 8-a0605c6afccf.html
(" 'Their ability with rocketry and whatnot has essentially changed the dynamic,' [Retired General Stanley] McChrystal said. China has touted hypersonic missiles that could sink a US aircraft carrier")
(i) I have doubt about the veracity of the quotation. Not only are hypersonic missiles experimental, but ships are moving targets, not sitting ducks.
(ii) Axios (website)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axios_(website)  
(2016- ; a news website; based in Arlington County, Virginia; The site's name is based on the Greek áxios, meaning "worthy")
(c) Only US Air Force, not other services, has Checkmate, a "strategic studies group."
News: Checkmate: Strategic Studies Group Supports Leaders. US Air Force, June 5, 2007
https://www.af.mil/News/Article- ... p-supports-leaders/
("Since its inception in the 1970s, Checkmate has been a cross-functional planning and analysis organization on the Air Staff that has taken on various roles depending on the needs of the Air Force's senior leaders")