(2) Harlan Ullman, Reality Check #10: China Will Not Invade Taiwan. Atlantic Council, Feb 18, 2022.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ ... -not-invade-taiwan/
Quote:
(a) "The definitive document on what size force would be required to seize Taiwan in a full-out landing was drafted by the US military in the late stages of World War II in the Pacific. In 1944, Operation Causeway was the US plan for retaking Formosa, as it was then called, from 30,000 starving Japanese soldiers. The planned invasion force was double the size of Operation Overlord, the Normandy landing: 400,000 soldiers and marines deployed on 4,000 ships. With a potential defending force of 450,000 Taiwanese today, using the traditional three-to-one ratio of attackers to defenders taught at war colleges, China would need to deploy over 1.2 million soldiers (out of a total active force of over 2 million). Many thousands of ships would be required to land all those forces, and doing so would take weeks. How many occupation forces would be required to pacify the Taiwanese? Surely the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are not lost on the PLA leadership.
(b) "Taiwan is only 100 miles off the Chinese coast. With China's DF-21 and other missiles with ranges of 1,500-2,000 miles, a reinforcing naval force [to aid Taiwan] would come under fire for at least two or more day's steaming before reaching the combat area. They would also have to avoid submarine and other maritime threats. The same problem applies to aviation units that would enter China's air defense zones.
"To complicate this matter of reinforcement and coming to Taiwan’s defense, some polls show that Americans are more worried about a Chinese invasion than are the Taiwanese. Defending a friend is more difficult when that friend is less preoccupied or concerned with the threat than US citizens are. The United States cannot be successful in defending Taiwan if it [this 'it' and the next refers to US, rather than Taiwan] regards the Chinese threat as more dangerous than the country it intends to protect
"Finally, fixating on an unlikely scenario, no matter how compelling it sounds, skews US resources and force levels. An expeditionary force designed to protect Taiwan may not fit more relevant roles such as supporting formal treaty allies, responding to other contingencies, and influencing China by force dispositions—especially if there is no appetite to invade in the first place. It was no accident that Napoleon and Hitler failed to cross the 25-mile wide English Channel!
(c) "Misunderstanding an adversary in developing a strategy leads to failure, or worse. Hitler thought Russia would fold in 1941. The Japanese thought Pearl Harbor would force an American capitulation. Gen. Douglas MacArthur did not believe the Chinese would intervene in Korea as his forces raced toward the Yalu River in late 1950. Washington believed it could bomb North Vietnam into submission, that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and that Iraqis could easily takeover governing their country after Saddam Hussein had been overthrown.
(d) "What is the solution? [which is sectional heading] * * * 2 Learn how to win wars, not just battles. No matter how much effort is placed on developing policy and strategy, successive US administrations have ignored the following contradiction: The US military has become adept at winning battles, but the United States has become adept at losing wars. This must change. US policymakers and strategists should take account of the failures of the last several decades and incorporate these lessons into discussions of what a war with China would entail and how it might end.
"3 US strategy to address the threat to Taiwan must change. * * * Rather than persisting with an offensive-minded approach based on costly and vulnerable platforms, US and Taiwanese planners must adopt a Porcupine Defense and its Pacific variant, a Mobile Maritime Defense, to keep China’s military within the first island chain * * * Such a strategy would greatly complicate any future bid by China to take the island by force. But can Taiwan be convinced to undertake this approach? Taiwan has chosen to buy systems to attack China. This is a mistake. Taiwan will never have the capacity to deter a Chinese assault by threat of retaliation ['offensive-minded' and 'Taiwan has chosen to buy systems to attack China' hints at Taiwan's military brass mulling landing in mainland China should China invade first]. However, at lower cost, this Porcupine capability can be bought.
Note:
(a) Source: Dictionary of American Family Names ©2013 (by Oxford University Press).
(i)
(A) The Northern Irish surname (of English origin) Harlan is "altered form of Harland."
(B) The English (mainly northeastern) surname Harland is "name from any of various minor places (including perhaps some now lost) named from Old English har gray, hara hare, or hær rock, tumulus + land tract of land, estate, cultivated land, notably Harland in Kirkbymoorside."
As you might have guessed correctly by now, hare and land in Modern English descended from Old English, so did gray or grey (from Old English grǣg).
(ii)
(A) The German surname Ullman is "a pet form of Ullrich."
(B) The German surname Ulrich is "from the personal [given] name Ulrich, Old High German Odalric, composed of the elements odal inherited property, fortune + ric power."
(b) Atlantic Council
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_Council
(1961- ; a think tank favoring Atlanticism and based in Washington, DC)
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