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Re: 基于权利的概念分析政治左右派的区别和土共的本质zz
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谢谢给出原文，看来我在这点上的确错了，可能是混淆了后来某些人的修正和Hohfeld的原意，很抱歉（Hohfeld的原著以及法学界相关争论是很早以前读的，和我后来的方向没有什么联系，而我又比较同意批评者认为这种体系用处不大的观点，加上这次回帖时手头没有参考书，细节上果然出问题了，惭愧惭愧）。等我回学校以后再找找关于在财产权有无liberty rights方面修正Hohfeld体系的相关文献吧。
道歉之后，我想补充说明的是，即便财产权包括liberty rights，这并未削弱我一开始回帖时所说的，不应当把征税理解为liberty right与claim right两者之间的交换。既然财产权中总是同时存在liberty right与claim right两种权利，我在把一部分财产作为税金上缴国库的时候，自然同时放弃了对这部分财产的liberty right与claim right，这其中并不存在两者的交换与冲突。从更大的层面说，用Hohfeld的框架去理解自由主义与自由至上主义之间的争论是不恰当的，这是我一开始的重点所在
【 在 stuartl (stewie) 的大作中提到: 】
: 俺在archive.org读了Hohfeld的原著，不敢自称完全消化了，只是完全不觉得后文的correlation把liberty right的成分排除在财产权之外。Hohfeld论述的correlatives（原文好像没有用correlation这个词）主要指的是权利范畴内的一些基本概念之间的相依性（如甲方claim right和乙方duty）。下面是一些Hohfeld的原话和俺粗浅的理解，涉及契约，liberty right（privilege），和财产权：
: 引文一（p.31）：“Passing to the field of contracts, we soon discover a similar inveterate tendency to confuse and blur legal discussions by failing to discriminate between the mental and physical facts involved in the so-called "agreement" of the parties, and the legal "contractual obligation" to which those facts give rise. Such ambiguity and confusion are peculiarly incident to the use of the term "contract." One moment the word may mean the agreement of the parties; and then, with a rapid and unexpected shift, the writer or speaker may use the term to indicate the contractual obligation created by law as a result of the agreement.”
: Hohfeld批评了把“契约”和“责任”混同起来的做法，但隐含的意思是义务来自法律强制的背景下对契约的执行。Hohfeld写书的目的是澄清法学概念，所以这里的概念比较狭窄；如果脱离法律体系考虑最简单的民间个人之间的关系，义务仍然来自某种契约或约定。俺在这里把obligation和duty当作同义词，如果不妥请指正。
: 引文二（p.32）：“in the creation of a contractual obligation between A and B, the affirmative operative facts are, inter alia, that each of the parties is a human being...”
: 契约责任（和随之产生的权利义务关系）只存在于人与人之间（还有其他一些条件）。人对物的财产权是相对于其他人而言，不是相对于物而言。假如没有契约，那么人对物的占有只是行为，不是权利。这本书的第二部分专门论述了这个议题，就不另外引述了。
: 引文三（p.38-39）：“if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place...
: “whereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the hind, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point; for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former's own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty, — for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege; — but it still holds good that, as regards Y. X's privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off.
: “Passing now to the question of "correlatives." it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a "no-right," there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X's right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y's duty not to enter; but the correlative of X's privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y's "no-right" that X shall not
: enter.”
: 上面这些引文非常重要，因为涉及了财产权（土地使用权），也涉及了相依性（correlative）：一，X对土地的占有权是claim right（Hohfeld称之为right），相依/等同于Y不得进入的义务；二，X进入自家土地这一使用权是liberty right（Hohfeld称之为privilege）但进不进去随他自己、他只是没有不进去的义务；三，如果X和Y之间有一个专门的契约要求X进入自家土地，X就有了进入的义务，但这是相对于Y依据后一个契约（和财产权无关）要求X进入自家土地的claim right而言的；四，X进入自家土地的liberty right（privilege）相依/等同于Y无权禁止X这样做，这是Y的“无要求”（no-right），针对X对土地的财产权而言。
: 引文四（p.41-42）“"The eating of shrimp salad is an interest of mine, and. if I can pay for it, the law will protect that interest, and it is therefore a right of mine to eat shrimp salad which I have paid for..."
: “This passage seems to suggest primarily two classes of relations: first, the party's respective privileges, as against A, B, C, D and others in relation to eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective "no-rights" of A, B, C, D and others that the party should not eat the salad; second, the party's respective rights (or claims) as against A, B, C, D and others that they should not interfere with the physical act of eating the salad, or, correlatively, the respective duties of A. B, C, D and others that they should not interfere.
: ...
: “Perhaps the essential character and importance of the distinction can be shown by a slight variation of the facts. Suppose that X, being already the legal owner of the salad, contracts with Y that he (X) will never eat this particular food. With A, B, C, D and others no such contract has been made. One of the relations now existing between X and Y is, as a consequence, fundamentally different from
: the relation between X and A. As regards Y, X has no privilege of eating the salad ; but as regards either A or any of the others, X has such a privilege. It is to be observed incidentally that X's right that Y should not eat the food persists even though X's own privilege of doing so has been extinguished.”
: 花钱买的沙拉是购买者的财产，所伴随的财产权包含两个成分：吃沙拉，作为使用权是liberty right（privilege）；不让别人干涉自己吃沙拉，作为占有权是claim right（Hohfeld总算在这里用了claim这个词）。购买者（X）可以和Y达成契约保证自己不吃这盘沙拉，也就是放弃了自己这份财产的使用权，但相对于Y以外的别人，X仍然有使用权，而且对于包括Y在内的所有的外人，X即使不使用财产也仍然有占有权。
: 引文五（p.60）：“X, the owner of a watch, has the power to abandon his property — that is, to extinguish his existing rights, powers, and immunities relating thereto (not, however, his privileges, for until someone else has acquired title to the abandoned watch, X would have the same privileges as before) ; and correlatively to X's power of abandonment there is a liability in every other person. But such a liability instead of being onerous or unwelcome, is quite the opposite. As regards another person, M, for example, it is a liability to have created in his favor (though against his will) a privilege and a power relating to the watch, — that is, the privilege of taking possession and the power, by doing so, to vest a title in himself.”
: Hohfeld花费了极长的篇幅详细论述了和财产权有关的二级权利，但咱们在这个问题上没有分歧，所以就不多说了；上面这段引文有意思的地方就是在二级权利的上下文之内涉及了财产权的liberty right成分（X使用手表的privilege）。还谈到M获得手表的privilege，但这是获得财产的权利，不属于通常意义上的财产权，而属于经济自由，或者“追求幸福”的自由。M获得这块手表的liberty right（privilege）原本不存在，被X的power修订之后才产生。从权利之起源的角度来考虑，假如没有社会契约，M原本有更大的liberty right——抢夺或偷窃原属于X的手表——但社会契约之下这些伦理上的“假自由”（逻辑上仍然是真自由）必须被让渡，所以正常情况下M对这块手表没有liberty right，除非依赖X的power。
: 引文六（p.76-77）“Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the Owner of Whiteacre... as regards Blackacre, A has besides his rights, or claims, against B. C. D. E, and others, various legal privileges of controlling and using the land, and that these exist "to, over, or against" the land.”
: Hohfeld著作的第二部分论述了相对于少数个体的权利（right in personam，或paucital right，比如两个人之间的契约所决定的权利）和相对于庞大群体的权利（right in rem，或multital right，比如财产占有权，任何他人不得侵犯），在这个上下文中仍然涉及物主控制和使用财产的liberty right（privilege）。
: 引文七（p.92-94）：“"Though legal ownership is conceived fundamentally as a right good against all the world, actual instances of such ownership are often much more narrowly limited..." instead of there being a single right with a single correlative duty resting on all the persons against whom the right avails, there are many separate and distinct rights, actual and potential, each one of which has a correlative duty resting upon some one person. Repeating a hypothetical case put above, let us suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre... B, C, D, and others indefinitely... respectively considered, shall not enter on Blackacre. It is not a case of one joint duty of the same content resting on all... Consistently with this view, A might, e.g., extinguish B's duty or, in other words, grant B the privilege of entering by giving "leave and license" to do so. In such event, of course, the respective duties of C, D, E, and all others would continue to exist, precisely as before.”
: 上面这段话的目的是进一步解析“相对于庞大群体的权利”（right in rem，或multital right）的精微含义，但也涉及财产权的例子：A给予B进入A的土地的liberty right（privilege）。这里的“grant”就是二级权利power，修改了原先的一级权利（假如没有任何契约也就没有财产占有权，B随便去哪里都可以，包括Blackacre；在社会契约和产权契约之下B失去了进入A的土地Blackacre的自由；现在A又运用自己作为物主的power把这个自由重新赋予B）。
: 引文八（p.96-97）“A multital right, or claim (right in rem), should not be confused with any co-existing privileges or other jural relations that the holder of the multital right or rights may have in respect to the same subject-matter... A has an indefinite number of legal privileges of entering on the land, using
: the land, harming the land, etc., that is, within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases ; and correlative to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other persons... In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, multital, or in rem, "right — duty" relations, multital, or in rem, "privilege — no-right" relations, multital, or in rem, "power — liability" relations, and multital, or in rem, "immunity — disability" relations... A's privileges, e.g., are strikingly independent of his rights or claims against any given person, and either might exist without the other.”
: 基本上是在重复早先的东西，但明确列出了财产权的两个一级权利（包括privilege）和两个二级权利。全书总共114页，俺看到最后也没有找出哪一处否定了财产权具有liberty right成分；相反，Hohfeld逻辑性极强，全书前后自洽。
: 关于当代学者的论点，俺是业余票友，难以查阅社科文献，所以只好借助网络和图书馆。Peter Jones能否算作有影响力的学者？他1994年出版的Rights一书详细讨论了Hohfeld体系（开篇第一章就是这个话题，俺只看了这一章），俺在网上读过的一些资料也引用或转述了Jones的观点。下面是Jones在Rights书中的原话，和Hohfeld原著以及俺昨天提供的斯坦佛大学网站上的说法是完全一致的：“if I have a property right in a car, that right is likely to consist of a complicated cluster of Hohfeldian rights. Typically these would include the claim-right that others should refrain from damaging my car or using it without my permission, my liberty-right as owner of the car to use the car, the power to sell the car or to permit others to use it, and my immunity from any power of others to dispose of the car without my consent. In other words, a single assertion of right might, on inspection, turn out to be a cluster of different types of right.” 当然，您可以说Jones没有真正理解Hohfeld。俺没有找到专门论证财产权不具有liberty right成分的文章，可以说俺在网上看过的所有的涉及财产权的资料都或者像Jones一样明确说明财物使用权是liberty right，或者没有涉及这个细节。
: 总而言之，财产权作为复合权利具有liberty right的成分，是Hohfeld的原始观点；您说后来有人把财产权的使用权成分也当作claim right，这种新理论推翻了Hohfeld体系的重要论点，而不是顺延发挥、在Hohfeld理论框架内阐述Hohfeld没有涉足的领域。Hohfeld英年早逝，咱们无法猜测他是否会接受这种新理论，但俺认为Hohfeld理论是正确的，那种新理论不是“修正”而是歪曲。谁能提供否定财产权具有liberty right成分的学术论文？俺很想看看这种新理论是怎样推导出来的。
: 【 在 dikaios 的大作中提到: 】
: : 法学界误以为property rights包括liberty rights也不乏其人，这不希奇，因为Hohfeld的原文是先讨论各个概念的opposition（我有做某件事的liberty right /privilege /permission，意味着我没有不做这件事的duty），过了几节后才讨论各个概念的correlation（我有做某件事的liberty right /privilege /permission，意味着别人
: : 关于property rights在Hohfeld的框架下究竟应当如何理
: : (以下引言省略...)
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发表于 7-14-2009 08:36:06
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