(3)
(a) War jitters | The Peril of 'Peak China;' A new book warns America that a weakening China is more likely to invade [Taiwan]. The Economist, Sept 3, 2022
https://www.economist.com/china/ ... e-than-a-strong-one
("A new book by two American geostrategists argues that the acute peril is now. In 'Danger Zone: the Coming Conflict with China,' Hal Brands of Johns Hopkins University and Michael Beckley of Tufts University * * * The authors thus flip the 'Thucydides trap' popularised by another professor, Graham Allison, who argued that China and America were destined for war in the same way a rising Athens and a fearful Sparta came to blows in antiquity. Messrs Brands and Beckley argue instead that the Athens of Thucydides was not an upstart, but a risen power fighting to avert decline. Imperial Japan's fearful of economic strangulation, leading to its surprise attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, is an example of such a 'peaking power trap.' Both elements of the thesis -- that China is peaking and that war is imminent -- are contested by other analysts. Yet it captures something of the zeitgeist in Washington. Experts debates whether China's slowdown means it has hit the 'middle-income trap' * * * Many experts have come a cropper predicting China's collapse. Still, Messrs Brands and Beckley argues that its stellar growth resulted [note the past tense' from several factors that are now reversing. A demographic boom is turning to bust. Market reforms are yielding to a re-centralisation of the economy, the cowing of innovative tech firms and a struggle to control debt. A 'smarter autocracy' with slightly looser political controls has reverted to the more oppressive form, creating a techno-surveillance state. And instead of embracing China's rise, rich countries have started to constrain trade. Some economists, such as Thomas Orlik, argue that China's rulers have enough resources, regulatory levers and experience to avert a systemic crisis. A new edition of his book on China's economy, 'The Bubble that never Pops,' is about to be published. In a commentary for Foreign Affairs, a journal, Oriana Skylar Mastro of Stanford University and Derek Scissors of the American Enterprise Institute, a think-tank, argues that the hard fall is unlikely. China's relative decline, if it happens, is likely to be gradual, Its military power will keep growing. It will want to seize Taiwan, but need not lash out, Rising or peaking, China is liable to be more aggressive")
Note:
(i) Peak China is modeled after
peak oil
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peak_oil
, which said world oil (or petroleum) was being used up. I thought the theory was true but fracking later debunked it.
(ii) come a cropper
https://www.worldwidewords.org/qa/qa-com2.htm
(b) Vietnam's economy | Chain Reaction; Trade wars, a pandemic and deglobalisation have all failed to stop Vietnam's rise. The Economist, Sept 24, 2022
https://www.economist.com/asia/2 ... -of-deglobalisation
("Since 2000, Vietnam's GDP has grown faster than that of any Asian country bar China, averaging 6.2% per year. It has lured big foreign firms in droves. What started with apparel makers such as Nike and Adidas seeking low-skilled labour has turned into a boom in electronics—higher-value goods that create better-paid jobs for more highly skilled workers. In 2020 electronics made up 38% of Vietnam's goods exports, up from 14% of a much smaller pie in 2010 (see chart)/ The trade war between America and China, which started in 2018 has helped. In 2019 Vietnam produced nearly half of the $31bn-worth of American imports that moved from China to other low-cost Asian countries (though some of these goods were probably just modified Chinee-made ones stamped 'Made in Vietnam'). Add to that growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, China's onerous pandemic restrictions and its rising labour costs, and it is easy to see why many big firms are turning to Vietnam. Apple's biggest suppliers, Foxconn and Pegatron * * * are building big factories in Vietnam * * * Other big names moving chinks of production from China to Vietnam includes Dell and HP (laptops), Google (phones) and Microsoft (Game consoles). * * * [its] GDO per person [is] $2,800 today * * * Vietnam has many things working in its favour. Its working force will remain young and sprightly as China's ages and shrinks. The country is an enthusiastic member of over a dozen free0trade agreements, giving its easier access to scores of national market. Its political leaders are less skittish about covid019 than China's, too. Vietnam opened its borers in March. China retains many barriers to entry. The country of some 100m people also has geographical blessings * * * it is right on China's doorstep. Thanks to massive infrastructure spending on things like new roads, its electronics cluster is just a 12-hour drive from Shenzhen, China's tech capital. 'You don't have to reinvent your supply chains here,' says one industrial park operator. The government's knackdor staying cosy with both China and America is valuable, too. [But Vietnamese suppliers for electronics produce some of the simplest that foreign firms want and are of poor quality.] Nor can Vietnam simply copy out of the playbook of China or South Korea. Globalisation is out of favour., Big markets are reshoring. Trade deals prohibit the state-aid tactics used by some other countries that went from poverty to prosperity. * * * workers are plentiful in Vietnam, but talented manager are rare, So are skilled technicians. * * * its vocational--training programmes need a boost. * * * It Vietnam is to grow as rich as China, let alone Japan, South Korea or Taiwan, it will ha to invest not only in infrastructure, but also in its people")
Note: "Add to that growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, China's onerous pandemic restrictions and its rising labour costs, and it is easy to see * * *:
comes from "Add growing geopolitical tensions between the superpowers, [ii] China's onerous pandemic restrictions and [iii] its rising labour costs TO THAT, and it is easy to see * * * "
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