独裁者竞选手册

bridged

本文通过一路BBS站telnet客户端发布



简介


这是美国《外交政策》杂志09年第三期上的一篇文章，作者以独裁者的口吻分析了一下自己该如何赢得民主选举，文字轻松幽默，内容意味深长




为什么在公开竞选越来越多的今天“民主”却依然难以实现？一个头脑中的小实验就能帮你理解为什么把那些老朽的独裁者们赶下台是如此地困难。

原苏联的统治者们曾经是那么地害怕公开竞选。他们认为，竞选将赋予公民反对“伟大光荣正确”政府的权力，而我们西方那些研究政治系统的专家也是这样想的。然而，当铁幕落下，竞选真正席卷全球后，民主却好像没有带来它曾经期许的自由与幸福。很多时候，旧日的统治者令人惊异地依然能够以既有的方式统治着一切。肯定是什么地方出了问题，但是哪里呢？

为了找寻答案，我将自己设想为一个年迈的独裁者，比如埃及的穆巴拉克。要在民主的环境里维持自己的权力，我将面临哪些选择呢？尽管想起来挺难过，但我必须诚实面对一个问题：我的人民并不爱戴我。他们不仅没有对我创造的丰功伟绩感激涕零，反而越来越意识到，当其它国家日新月异地发展时，我长期统治下的他们的伟大祖国却陷入了停滞。外面有些声音甚至坚定地认为这糟糕的一切都是我的错。我无奈地摇摇头，难以置信自己走到了今天这一步，然后拿起桌上的金笔，开始把我面临的选择都一一列出来。我下决心要把所有选择写得有条有理，每一项都仔细权衡利弊。
                                                                         ————保罗·柯林

选择1 ： 翻到历史的新一页并且全身心拥抱一个好政府的诞生

好处： 这可能正是大多数人希望的。我或许能够感觉到自己还是个怪不错的人，没准还能给子孙后代留下一份值得骄傲的政治遗产。

坏处：我还真不知道这玩意儿该怎么操作。我多年来运用娴熟的政治手腕与这东西格格不入。总的来说，我只擅长通过喂饱一大群利益相关者来维持自己的权力。天哪，我以后没准儿还要去研读那些给捐款人写的狗屎报告。退一步说，即使我搞清楚哪里需要进行改革，现在的行政系统恐怕也没有能力去执行。毕竟，我花费了多年的时间与精力来确保行政系统里那些出色或正直的人统统要被排挤出去，因为正直的人大都难以被控制。

更糟的是，改革也许是危险的。我的朋友们，哦不，是我周围那些寄生虫一样的马屁精们，他们可能不会容忍什么改革，为此他们甚至可能搞个宫廷政变把我给赶下台，然后再把政变精心打扮成一个外人看起来的所谓“改革”！

假设我干了我该干的，假设我真的建立了一个好政府，我会再次当选吗？我开始回忆起那些以前见过的富国领导人们，他们总是教育我要建立一个良好的政府。我大概算了一下，他们赢得自己竞选的机率大概是45%，还不到一半。

所以，即使改革成功，我也很可能丢掉权力。我最好还是作弊吧，但该怎么做呢？

选择2 ：欺骗选民

好处：我控制了大部分的媒体，所以这事儿相对来说不难办。还有，我的人民受教育程度都不高，而且也没有好的外界参照来让他们知道自己的处境有多糟糕，所以我完全可以跟他们说，有我这样的总统他们实在是三生有幸。

坏处：由于这一套已经搞了很多年，人民对我的信任现在已经大打折扣。看来，尽管“欺骗”这法子绝对值得采用，但我肯定不能单靠这一招儿来赢得胜利。

选择3：把少数族裔拎出来当替罪羊

好处：这招儿绝对灵！我可以把一切问题都归咎于国内的少数族裔或是外国政府。仇恨政治学有着悠久而辉煌的历史，尤其是对于选举而言。科特迪瓦的布基纳法索移民、津巴布韦的白人农场主、民主刚果的图西族，这些都是近些年利用仇恨的经典范例。实在不行，我至少还可以骂以色列啊，哦不，应该直接骂美国。我还可以向自己的族群多许诺些好处，作为配套。

坏处：我有些朋友是少数族裔。实际上，他们这些年一直在给我提供资金支持，我当然也回报了他们不少的好处。一直以来，我都喜欢跟少数族裔谈生意，因为不管他们变得多富有，对我也构不成政治上的威胁。倒是那些主体民族的人我一直要多加提防，不能让他们太得势。如果对少数族裔吓唬得太厉害，他们可能把资产转移国外然后逃之夭夭。所以，尽管找替罪羊这招儿肯定奏效，但做得过火了的话代价会很高。

选择4：花钱买选票

好处：相对于我的竞争者，搞贿选对我而言是有绝对优势的，因为我比他们谁的钱都多。

坏处：我真能相信那些选民吗？如果我给了他们钱，能保证他们一定会选我吗？毕竟，外头那种光拿钱不干事儿的“二皮脸”太多了。

总之，这事儿有点儿拿不准。我在网上查了一下，无意中发现了牛津大学一个叫皮德罗·文森特的人做的研究。文森特在某非洲小国做了一项关于“贿选”的实验。他观察了几个选区的选举情况，其中有些是有外界监督的，而有些没有。在那些没有监督而贿选几乎没有限制的选区，贿选的竞选人最终获得了更多的选票。看来，贿选这招儿也还蛮灵的。

贿选有两种模式：零售和批发。一个个地去送钱成本略高，操作也困难些，但仍然值得一试。它最大的好处就是可以精确定位地把钱砸到那些对我获得胜利最有帮助的人头上。

贿选不会造成什么麻烦。如果英国工党被发现花钱买选票，那他们的选举基本也就完蛋了。但在在像我们这样的很多国家，人们看待选举的角度很不一样：政治家们上台之后几乎什么也干不成，于是，人们期望在选举期间，当他们的手中小小的权力还能施展一下的时候，那些政客们能够派发点儿好处出来。进了口袋的真金白银总好过空头支票吧。既然政客们能不受批评地公开贿选，他们是怎么保证投票人信守承诺的呢？毕竟，投票是不记名的。是什么因素阻止了选民拿了张三的钱最后不会又投票给了李四呢？

在肯尼亚，那些在野党意识到劝服选民不拿政府贿选的钱根本就是天方夜谭，想都别想。于是他们劝说人民拿了政府的钱后依然要投票给反对党。

为什么反对党这样做最后依然无效呢？我觉得主要有两点：一，有点儿搞笑，是因为人们的道德感。很多时候，一般人如果拿了谁的钱又去做对不起别人的事，心里总是会不舒服。二，是因为人们担心被发现。投票这种事儿能做到多隐秘呢？在津巴布韦，穆加贝总统的街头眼线们不停散布消息说政府肯定会知道大家最后投票给了谁。在一个恶政横行的国家，这可不是说着玩的。

但是，每个选民要花我多少钱呢？我需要买多少张选票，而我又买得起多少张选票呢？还有没有更便宜的办法来搞选票呢？

别忘了还有批发贿选方式。贿赂以选区形式发放，不落实到个人。“集体投票”在贫穷保守的农村地区很常见，通常都是那些地方上的有头有脸的人说了算。计票的时候，很多村庄把选票100%地投给某个候选人的情况可以说是屡见不鲜。如果那些地头蛇们能决定周围人的选票，直接把他们搞定显然要便宜得多。

总的来说，贿选是个好办法。唯一的问题是不知道我是否有足够的钱来买选票。

选择5：恐吓选民

好处：大部分的政治家总是试图通过迎合选民来获得选举，其实还有一个完全相反的有效手段——恐吓。大部分人都不是那么勇敢，当面对一群威胁着要动粗的打手时，他们一般都会知难而退而不是奋起抗争。

恐吓战术最大的好处就在于，即使我无法知道大家投票给了谁，但至少我能知道他们是否投了票。民主国家“身份政治”那套我也一直在搞，所以我对那些要投票给发对派的人了如指掌，我可以威胁他们，“如果去投票，一切后果自负”。

坏处：暴力政治一旦开始就很难停止了。那边儿的人也可能开始玩狠的。毕竟，他们人多！要不是他们人多我也就不用担心会输掉选举了。我可不想在一场暴力对决中输得一败涂地。想着想着，街头示威的汹涌人群席卷一切的景象逐渐映入脑海，那场景伊朗的国王见过，海地的杜瓦利埃见过，罗马尼亚的齐奥塞斯库见过，印尼的苏哈托也见过。到那时候，你甚至不能指望自己的士兵会服从开枪的命令。

选择6：逼迫有实力的竞争者退出竞选

好处：这一招儿对我很有诱惑力，不仅大大提高了胜选的机率，而且直接打击了我最痛恨的那些人：我的竞选对手们。我必须找点儿理由让他们滚蛋，这也没什么难的。我可以抨击他们搞腐败——毕竟，谁的屁股都不干净。更妙的是，资助我的那批商人一直要求我打击腐败，这样可谓一举两得。如果腐败问题太敏感，搞不好可能会引火烧身，我还可以试试在他们公民身份上做做文章，给他们硬安个外国老爸，直接以不具竞选资格之由驱逐出竞选。

坏处：除非我把这事儿做绝，就像尼日利亚的阿巴察当年那样，确保自己成为唯一的竞选者，要不然，选民总是还有机会选择其他人。尽管跟我竞争的只剩下一批烂人，但愚蠢的选民很可能最后还真去选了那些垃圾。

担心，太担心了，肯定还应该有什么别的办法。然后，我想起来了，长舒一口气，仰天长啸。

选择7：最后一招，虚算选票

好处：终于，我找到了最靠得住的妙招。一招在手，横行天下。真实的选举结果也许会是：我1票；对手1千万票。但第二天的报纸头条必然写着：“现任总统最终险胜”。这一招还可以与其它招数产生联动。一旦人们意识到选票最后不会被真的计算进去，他们就更不可能拒绝贿选或是投靠反对派了。而且，我还可以一直引而不发，直到最后快输的时候再使出这个杀手锏，一举扭转乾坤。

坏处：国际社会可能会不喜欢。没事，我记着别做得太过分就行，得票率99%就有点儿过了，搞得跟苏联选举似的那可太丢人了。

（数据显示，全球最贫穷的那部分人口中举行的民主选举，尽管选民们都牢骚满腹，但当权者照样可以顺利地获得74%的选票。如果竞选的外部监督再弱化些，得票率甚至可以达到88%。不知道怎么搞的，当权者在他们的社会中都非常善于不断赢得选举。

当年的苏联领导人对竞选的恐惧让我们误以为竞选本身就会是民主的胜利。其实，竞选作弊没有多难，实际上，只有真正脑子不好的独裁者才会选择竞选不作弊。）

保罗·柯林是牛津大学经济学教授，此文节选自他的著作《战争，枪炮和选举：危险地区的民主》。



更多关于 独裁 贿选 选举 政治 竞选 的翻译文章

理解美国堕胎观念的变迁
印度大选挥金如土
纽约时报：儒家党
“橙色肥皂剧”何时落幕？


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4877
The Dictator’s Handbook

By Paul Collier

May/June 2009

Why is democracy failing even as elections proliferate? A thought experiment sheds new light on why aging autocrats remain so hard to dislodge.

The old rulers of the Soviet Union were terrified of facing contested elections. Those of us who studied political systems presumed they must be right: Elections would empower citizens against the arrogance of government. And with the fall of the Iron Curtain, elections indeed swept the world. Yet democracy doesn’t seem to have delivered on its promise. Surprisingly often, the same old rulers are still there, ruling in much the same old way. Something has gone wrong, but what?

To answer this question, I put myself in the shoes of an old autocrat—say, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak—now having to retain power in a “democracy.” What options do I face? Hard as it is to bear, I have to be honest with myself: My people do not love me. Far from being grateful for the wonders that I have achieved, they may increasingly be aware that under my long rule our country has stagnated while similar countries have transformed themselves. There are even a few cogent voices out there explaining why this situation is my fault. I shake my head in disbelief that it has come to this, seize my gold pen, and start listing my options. I decide to be systematic, in each case evaluating the pros and cons.

--Paul Collier

Option 1: Turn over a new leaf and embrace good government  

Pros: This is probably what most people want. I might start feeling better about myself, and I might even leave a legacy my children could be proud of.

Cons: I haven’t much idea how to do it. The skills I have developed over the years are quite different—essentially, retaining power through shuffling a huge number of people around a patronage trough. My God, I might have to read those damned donor reports. And even if I worked out what needed to change, the civil service wouldn’t be up to implementing it. After all, I’ve spent years making sure that anyone who is exceptional or even honest is squeezed out; honest people cannot easily be controlled.

Worse still, reform might be dangerous. My “friends,” the parasitic sycophants with whom I have surrounded myself, might not put up with it: They might decide to replace me in a palace coup. They would probably dress it up to the outside world as “reform”!

But suppose I did it. Suppose I actually delivered good government. Would I get reelected? I start to think about all those rich-country political leaders who over the years have met me, often lecturing me on the need for good governance. I do a rough tally: They seemed to win their own elections only about 45 percent of the time.

So, even if I pull it off, I’m still more than likely to lose power. Best to cheat. But how?


Illustration by Jason Lee for FP
Figure 1.1: Truth is a terrible thing to waste.
Option 2: Lie to the voters

Pros: I control most of the media, so it is relatively easy. What’s more, my citizens have neither much in the way of education nor good reference points by which to tell how bad things really are. So, I can tell them how fortunate they are to have me as president.

Cons: I have been doing this for years, so people heavily discount anything I say. On balance, though lying seems to be worth doing, I simply cannot rely on it to deliver victory.

Option 3: Scapegoat a minority

Pros: This one works! I can blame either unpopular minorities within my country or foreign governments for all my problems. The politics of hatred has a long and, electorally speaking, pretty successful pedigree. In the Ivory Coast it was the Burkinabe immigrants; in Zimbabwe, the whites; in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Tutsi. Failing all else, I can always blame Israel America. I can also promise favoritism for my own group.

Cons: Some of my best friends are ethnic minorities. In fact, they have been funding me for years in return for favors. I prefer doing business with ethnic minorities because, however rich they become, they cannot challenge me politically. It is the core ethnic groups I need to keep out of business. Scare the minorities too badly, and they will move their money out. So, though scapegoating works, beyond a certain point it gets rather costly.



The article is an adapted excerpt from Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, by Paul Collier, professor of economics at Oxford University. Copyright© 2009 by Paul Collier. Published by arrangement with HarperCollins Publishers.

     The Dictator’s Handbook

Option 4: Buy the votes to win

Pros: Bribing voters plays to one of my key advantages over the opposition—I have more money.

Cons: Can I trust people to honor the deal? If I pay them, will they actually vote for me? After all, there are some pretty unscrupulous people out there.

On balance, I am not sure. I search the Web and stumble on a study by someone named Pedro Vicente at Oxford University. Vicente conducted a randomized, controlled experiment on electoral bribery in São Tomé and Príncipe. In some districts, bribery was restrained by external scrutiny, whereas in others it was not. Systematically, where bribery was unrestrained, the candidate offering bribes got more votes. Bribery works!

In fact, bribery comes in two modes: retail and wholesale. Retail bribery is expensive and difficult but might still be worthwhile. Its advantage is that I can target pockets of voters critical for success.

Why doesn’t bribery backfire? If the British Labour Party were caught offering money to individual voters in exchange for their support, the electoral damage would be massive. But in many societies elections are viewed differently. Politicians deliver nothing during their periods in office, so people expect that during the one brief moment when they exert some power politicians should dispense patronage. Hard cash in the pocket is better than promises. But even if politicians can offer bribes without provoking criticism, how can they enforce the deal? After all, the vote is secret. What is to stop voters from accepting money and then voting for the opposition?

In Kenya, the opposition recognized that telling people not to take bribes would be a vote-loser and so did not even attempt it. Instead, it proposed that people should take bribes from the government but vote for the opposition.

Why is this not a very effective counter? I have two points of discipline. One, paradoxically, is morality: Often, ordinary decent people feel bad if they take someone’s money but then renege. The other is fear of detection: How secret is the ballot? In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe’s street boys spread the word that the government would know how votes were cast, and in the prevailing conditions of misgovernance, this warning could not be treated as an idle threat.

But how much does it cost to bribe the typical voter? How many votes do I need to buy, and how much can I afford? Is there a cheaper way of buying votes?


Illustration by Jason Lee for FP
Figure 1.2: Scare tactics work.
Indeed there is: wholesale bribery. Wholesale bribery works by paying for votes delivered in blocs rather than individually. Bloc voting is very common in impoverished, traditional, rural societies, where the local big shot’s advice is not seriously questioned. When votes are counted, it is common for many villages to have voted 100 percent for one candidate. If the big shot determines how individuals vote, it is obviously cheaper to buy his support directly.

Overall, bribery is my kind of strategy. The only problem is whether I have enough money to win with it.

Option 5: Intimidate the electorate

Pros: Most politicians try to ingratiate themselves with voters, but a radically different technique is to frighten them. Most people are not particularly brave. When confronted by thugs threatening personal violence, they back down rather than stand up for themselves.




   The Dictator’s Handbook

One big advantage of intimidation is that even if I cannot observe how people vote, I can observe whether they vote. Given that I am playing identity politics, I know perfectly well who intends to vote for my opponent. So, I can threaten them that if they vote they will suffer.

Cons: In politics, once violence starts, it’s hard to stop. The other side might turn nasty. After all, they have the advantage of numbers. If they didn’t, I would not have to worry about losing the election. I don’t want to risk losing a contest in violence. A few images float into view: the mass power of street protests sweeping out the shah of Iran, then Haiti’s “Baby Doc,” then Romania’s Nicolae Ceausescu, and finally Indonesia’s Suharto. It’s come to something when you can’t even rely on your own soldiers to shoot.

Option 6: Restrict the field to exclude the strongest candidates


Illustration by Jason Lee for FP
Figure 1.3: Reduce your adversaries.
Pros: This is particularly appealing because not only do I increase my chances of winning, but I hit directly at the people I most hate: my opponents. I have to find some reason for excluding them, but that is not particularly difficult. I can accuse them of corruption—after all, it is quite likely to be true. A delicious added benefit is that because donors are always urging me to be tougher on corruption, they can scarcely object. If corruption is too sensitive an issue to open, I can always try citizenship. It should be easy to trump up some ancestry that bars my enemies from running.

Cons: Unless I go whole hog, like Sani Abacha of Nigeria, and ensure I’m the only candidate on the ballot, voters will inevitably find some alternative to my own good self, however awful. They might even be sufficiently foolish to opt for it.

Worried, I wonder whether there is any strategy I have overlooked. And then I heave a long, deep sigh of relief.

Option 7: Last but not least, miscount the votes

Pros: Finally, I have found a strategy that sounds reliable. With this one, I literally cannot lose. The tally might be: incumbent, 1; opponent, 10,000,000. But the headline will read: “Incumbent Wins Narrowly.” It also has advantages in reinforcing some of the other strategies. Once people get the sense that I am going to win anyway and that their true votes will not be counted, they have even less incentive to forgo bribes and take the risk of joining the opposition. Better still, I can also keep this strategy in reserve until I see that I am losing.

Cons: The international community won’t like it. I’ll just have to remember not to go overboard: not 99 percent. It should not look like a Soviet election.

In the average election held among the bottom billion poorest of the world’s population, despite the fact that voters usually have many grounds for complaint, the incumbent “wins” a healthy 74 percent of the vote. In elections with particularly weak restraints, it is an even healthier 88 percent. Somehow or other, incumbents in these societies are very good at winning elections.

The dread shown by the Soviet authorities to any form of competitive election has confused us into thinking that achieving a competitive election is in itself the key triumph. The reality is that rigging elections is not daunting: Only the truly paranoid dictators avoid them anymore.

--